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ABSTRACT
The arguments of the thesis develop along three lines. First, we consider that 
ethnic politics does not pose any threat to Macedonia’s stability and territorial 
integrity. It is so because the Albanians in Macedonia do not enjoy the support of 
Albania or Kosova. Second, the politics of the Albanians in Macedonia is heavily 
dependent on internal dynamics within the state. Hence, the wrong western 
perceptions that Kosova events and its independence could trigger a chain of events 
leading to Macedonia’s break up. The Albanians in Macedonia strive for equality 
with the Macedonians. Finally, the foreign policy of the Albanian state has never 
been a destabilising factor for the region since its creation in 1912. Albania has 
managed to preserve its security by not dealing with the Albanian question. Even 
after the end of the Cold War, its policy was designed to preserve the status quo and 
avoid the war in the Balkans.
ui
ÖZET
Bu tezdeki argümanlar üç unsuru takip ediyor. Birincisi, Makedonya’nın 
etnik sorunları onun politik dengesini ve bölgesel bütünlüğünü tehdit etmemektedir, 
çünkü Makedonya’daki Arnavutlar Kosova’dan ve Arnavutluk’tan destek 
almamaktadır. İkincisi, MakedonyalI Arnavutlar bu devletin kendi politik durumuna 
daha fazla bağlıdırlar. Bu yüzden, Kosova’daki olayların ve Kosova’nın 
bağımsızlığının Makedonya’nın parçalanmasıyla sonuçlanacak bir dizi olay meydana 
getireceği yanlış bir öngörüdür. Makedonya’daki Arnavutlar MakedonyalIlarla 
eşitlik kavgası vermektedirler. Üçüncü ve son olarak, 1912’deki kuruluşundan 
itibaren Arnavutluk devleti hiçbir zaman bölgede dengeyi bozucu bir politika 
izlememiştir. Arnavutluk aslında diğer ülkelerdeki Arnavutların sorunlarıyla 
uğraşmayarak güvenliğini sağlamıştır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra da politikası 
statükoyu korumak ve bir Balkan savaşının çıkmasını engellemek üzerine olmuştur.
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INTRODUCTION
The security in the Southern Balkans depends upon the resolution o f two major 
issues, the solution of the Albanian Question and the preservation of the independence 
and stability of Macedonia. These two issues appeared after the collapse of the 
communist system, and in particular, the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The two questions 
have become more difficult to tackle considering the close inter-relationship between 
them, as a result of the existence of significant Albanian community in Macedonia.
The security of a multiethnic state, as is the case of Macedonia, depends on the 
dynamics of the inter-ethnic relationship. This dimension is analyzed in the first chapter 
of the thesis. In order to understand the transformation of the Macedonian question, we 
should be looking at its evolution since the turn of the century until now. The nation­
building process of the Macedonians and its impact on ethnic relations will be given 
special attention. The overview o f inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia is analysed through 
three different angles, beginning with the social level, then moving to ethnic relations in 
the economic area, and finally the political aspect of the inter-ethnic relations.
When an ethnic group in a given state is part of a larger national unit, then 
neighboring country’s attitude toward its ethnic kin has a direct impact on the security, 
and stability of the state. The impact of developments in Kosova on Macedonia is the 
topic of the second chapter. The reason why we are looking at this dimension is the 
general consensus on the part of policy-makers and regional analysts that the would-be 
status of Kosova and the conflict there is thought to be destabilizing for Macedonia under 
different scenarios. Since it is Kosova that constitutes the core of the Albanian question
in the Balkans, special space is given to the history of Albanian-Serb relations because 
this shapes the options for the future status of Kosova. We will be assessing the attitude 
of the international community toward the Kosova crisis and the Macedonian security 
against this background.
The attitude of Albania toward Albanians living in former Yugoslavia, in 
particular, in Macedonia and Kosova is analyzed in the third chapter. To examine this 
topic we will be looking at the attitude of Albania toward the national question, and the 
factors that have determined it. In the first section the foreign policy of the Albanian state 
during the inter-war period will be studied. The policies of the Albanian communist state 
will also be looked at some detail, not only in its foreign policy approach but also in the 
domestic aspect of the national question. The largest space of the chapter is devoted to 
the post-communist era. Here we will look at the foreign policy of the first democratic 
government, and try to explain the main factors that account for the substantial changes 
in Albania’s attitude from the communist regime. Due to the fragmentation of the 
Albanian factor in the Balkans as a result of Macedonia’s independence we have focused 
separately on the Albanian foreign policy toward Kosova and Macedonia. During the 
Socialist-led government under premiership of Nano, Albanian foreign policy underwent 
significant changes. With the changes in the Socialist-led government, the succession of 
Nano by Majko, the Albanian foreign policy was reversed. The interest of the Albanian 
public toward the national question and its effect on the Albanian foreign policy is also 
analyzed.
CHAPTER 1.
THE CONFINES OF ETHNIC POLITICS
'L l.The Transformation of the Macedonian Question
At the core of the Macedonian question existed the confluence of three factors; 
the immense geopolitical importance of the region controlling the north-south and 
east-west transportation routes, the declining authority of the Ottoman Empire, which 
created a vacuum in the region, and lastly, the mixed ethnic character of the area, and 
the lack of a well-developed national consciousness among its Slavic population, 
which prevented the emergence of a national movement that could have filled the 
power vacuum. This situation enticed Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs to pursue policies 
that would strengthen their positions in anticipation of Ottoman withdrawal. The 
rivalry between these three actors started first with priests and teachers and later 
escalated to armed bands. Although the three countries formed an alliance before the 
Balkan Wars the differences between them had not been fully settled as indicated by 
the Greek-Bulgarian treaty, which did not provide for a de-limitation of the territory.' 
The possibility of an autonomous Macedonia was not considered as a realistic option 
and Bulgaria agreed to a partition plan with Serbia.^ As a result of the developments 
during the Balkan Wars and First World War 51 percent the of the territory of 
Macedonia went to Greece, whereas Serbia and Bulgaria received 39 and 10 percent 
respectively.
' Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, New 
Rochelle, New York, 1993, p.38.
 ^Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in the Balkan Power Politics, Greenwood Press, Publishers. 
Westport, Connecticut, 1980, p. 18. Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, pp. 36-37.
The outbreak of the Second World War brought the Macedonian question to 
the forefront again. However, the dynamics of the question had changed compared to 
those of the turn of the century. The inability of the inter-war Yugoslav state to 
assimilate the local Slavic population was reflected in the difficulties Tito was facing 
in Macedonia. The Yugoslav Communist Party had been unable to ‘win the support of 
the majority of Macedonian Communists, let alone the mass of the people.’  ^ The 
position of the Yugoslav Communist Party strengthened in the course of 1943, only 
after Tito declared that he would recognize the Macedonian right to self- 
determination in the framework of Yugoslavia. Thus, only by accepting the 
emergence of a Macedonian entity could Tito make sure that he would not loose its 
part of the Macedonian region to the Bulgarians that had been in a stronger position." 
In addition, this helped Tito to move from the defensive position to the offensive, 
demanding the unification of all three parts of Macedonia in the framework of 
Yugoslavia, or even a wider federation. In a move that indicated that the dynamics of 
the Macedonian question had shifted, the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria in December 
1943 while rejecting the Yugoslav policy for a Macedonian entity within the 
framework of Yugoslavia, it also called for the establishment of a free and integral 
Macedonia guaranteed by the Soviet Union. ^
In contrast to the situation during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, 
realpolitik considerations had now brought into existence a Macedonian entity. All 
this would not have happened had the Macedonians develop a Serb national 
consciousness. Similarly, the policy of Tito would have failed had there not been 
differences between the Macedonians and Bulgarians, which is indicated by the 
increasing resentment of the Macedonian population against the Bulgarians’ behavior
 ^Barker, Macedonia, p. 89. 
Barker, Macedonia, pp. 90-92.
during the course of the Second World War, and the growth of autonomist feelings.* ^ 
As Wilkinson concludes, ‘the Macedonians, whatever their origin, had arrived at a 
state in their national development when identification with either Serbs or Bulgars 
was no longer possible.’^  The creation of a Macedonian entity also reduced the size of 
Serbia and created a more balanced Yugoslav Federation, though as we showed it was 
not created to serve this aim.
In Aegean and Pirin Macedonia, within Greece and Bulgaria respectively, 
permanent solutions to the Macedonian question were found in the sense that it did 
not pose any longer a threat to their territorial integrity and political stability. As a 
result o f population exchanges between Greece and Turkey, and Greece and Bulgaria 
after the First World War the ethnic composition of the Greece’s Macedonia has 
changed drastically. In Bulgaria, too, although there are people that ‘expose a 
Macedonian national consciousness as represented by UMO Ilinden, there are other 
organizations of Macedonians with a greater membership identifying themselves as 
part of the Bulgarian nation.*
The 1990s revealed that the Macedonian Question has been totally 
transformed and that the resemblance with the past exists only in the name. In contrast 
to the previous cases, the Macedonian question did not emerge as a result o f renewed 
rivalry between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, but as a consequence of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the decision of ethnic Macedonians to opt for 
independence, rather than remain in a Serb dominated rump Yugoslavia. Thus, for the 
first time the Macedonians emerged as actors in Balkan politics.
 ^Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Yugoslavia, p. 118.
® Hugh Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians? Y{\ast&£oTiviHiSiy,hor\Aoxi, 1995, pp. 101-2.
’ Quoted in Lorring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, Princeton University press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1995, p. 57.
* Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, p. 160.
Although the situation that developed in the 1990s was still being compared to 
the one during the turn of the century, and a number of war scenarios were advanced, 
as Stephan Troebst argued that was as a result of adopting a ‘static historical 
approach’, rather than engaging in up to date analysis.^
Although the behavior of Greece raised doubts among certain a n a l y s t s , i t  
was clear that it did not have any territorial claims. A Greek move against Macedonia 
would have cost her the membership of EU and NATO, and would have given to 
Turkey the upper hand in all their bilateral disputes. Bulgaria too, does not have any 
claim, as was indicated by the fact that it was the first country to recognize 
Macedonia. Even if Bulgaria had claims toward Macedonia is not in a position to 
create trouble. From all the neighbors Serbia has been singled out as the most 
dangerous. However, even Serbia did not appear to pose a serious threat. As Stephan 
Troebst notes that ‘it is unlikely that the Serbian leadership would have given up their 
favorable position in Macedonia, by virtue of the presence of the Yugoslav army, only 
to return later by force after the international presence, on the border.’ In addition, 
Troebst also points to the small size of the Serb minority in Macedonia, only 46000, 
which cannot play the role of its counterparts in Bosnia and Croatia, and the fact that 
the majority of population of Macedonia is not pro-Serb." The threat from the 
Albanians in Macedonia was not considered serious to force them to remain in rump 
Yugoslavia.
The fact that none of the scenarios involving Macedonia turned out to be 
true, despite the favorable conditions that existed in the early 1990s such as lack of 
diplomatic recognition, military weakness, and the general turbulent situation that
 ^Stephan Troebst, “Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused?”, RFL/RL Research Reports, Vol. 3, No. 4. 28 
January 1994.
Quoted in John Shea, Macedonia and Greece, McFarland, Jefferson, Nortli Caroline, 1977, p. 282. 
'' Stephan Troebst, “Macedonia Powder Keg Defused?”, pp. 34,37.
existed in the Balkans, indicates two things. That an independent Macedonia has had 
a sobering and balancing effect in the region, and/or the costs of military involvement 
far exceeded the benefits.
The ‘new’ Macedonian question now evolves around the relationship between 
the Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia. It is this issue that the rest o f the 
chapter explores. Before turning to the 1990s, it is important to look at the 
Macedonian nation-building period.
1.2.The Position of the Albanians in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia
With the establishment of Macedonia as a republic in the Yugoslav federation, 
steps were taken to strengthen the Macedonian national consciousness. The dialect of 
Bitola-Veles that was most different from Bulgarian and Serbian was chosen as 
Macedonian literary language, and the Macedonian autocephalous Orthodox church 
was established in 1967. The state institutions and the Party organs, all reflected and 
were part of the process of nation building.'^ The federal authorities were determined 
for security reasons, to make sure that Macedonian identity would take root as soon as 
possible. In other words, SFR of Macedonia was established and functioned as a pure 
nation-state, despite the existence of a significant Albanian minority within its 
borders.
The Albanian inhabited areas of north-west and western Macedonia were not 
attached to Kosova due to geographical, historical and political considerations 
Divided from Kosova by the Shar Mountains, this areas have been historically part of 
the Macedonian region. By keeping the Albanian populated areas within the SFR of 
Macedonia, the Federal authorities wanted to be ‘as far as possible accommodative
Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, pp. 116-7. Barnet Rubin, (ed.) Toward Comprehensive Peace 
in Southeast Europe, The twentieth Century Fund Press, New York, 1996, p. 34.
toward the Macedonian nationalism’ and at the same time weaken the Albanian factor 
by dividing it with administrative borders.'^
Although the conditions of the Albanians compared to the inter-war period 
had improved -  by 1951 more than 200 Albanian schools were open, reaching 287 by 
1981, and Albanian language media existed'"* -  Albanians were excluded from the 
decision-making in the republic and came to be regarded as second class citizens.'^ 
The representation of the Albanians in the League of Communists of Macedonia and 
the state administration was insignificant. In 1959 the Albanians and Turks combined 
represented only 2.29 percent of the Party membership, and until 1965 no Albanian or 
Turk had become member of the Party’s executive committee.'^ During the Rankovic 
years Albanians throughout Yugoslavia were a suppressed minority, and were seen as 
politically unreliable. However, while the fall of Rankovic in 1966 marked, for the 
Albanians of Kosova, the beginning of a new era, no significant change was noticed 
in Macedonia except for a few more educational and cultural rights. In Macedonia 
Albanians continued to have no say over the Party and state affairs.
The political marginalization of Albanians in Macedonia can be explained if 
we look at the process of Macedonian nation formation. As Duncan Perry notes: 
“Ethnic Macedonians historically have sought to affirm their nation in part by 
controlling the state institutions, infrastructure, education and media.” '* Though the 
use of the state resources to complete the process of nation formation is a phenomena 
that is not confined to Macedonia, and is a concomitant of nation building in
Robert King, Minorities under Communism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
1973, p. 132.
''' Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, pp. 125-6.
Mickey and Albion, “Success in the Balkans? A case Study of Ethnic Relations in the Republic of 
Macedonia”, in Cuthbertson and Leibowitz (eds.j. Minorities: the New Europe's Old Issue, Institute for 
EastWest Studies, 1993, pp. 56-57.
Isa Blumi, “The Question of Identity, Diplomacy and Albanians in Macedonia”, International 
Journal o f Albanian Studies, at http://i\vvw.albanian.com/lJAS/voll/isl/art4.hlml 
’’ Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, pp. 122.
1 19general, in the case of Macedonia the role played by the state institutions was 
deemed to be crucial. In this contexts, Albanian demands for participation in the 
decision making was perceived by Macedonians as a threat weakening their control 
over the state. Albanians constituted what is known as an ‘internal significant other’. 
A factor ‘disrupting the cultural and political order, and challenge its sense o f unity 
and authenticity.’ “^
Although in the constitution Macedonia was defined as ‘the state of the 
Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities’, the Macedonian 
political culture defined Macedonia as a nation-state, allowing no room for the 
participation of the Albanians. Of course, a symbolic number of people were to be 
found in state administration to pay lip service to the principle of ‘brotherhood and 
unity’.
In the Spring of 1981 massive demonstrations broke out in Kosova demanding 
republican status. Alarmed by the magnitude of the protests, the authorities brought 
the army to restore order and the state of emergency was declared in the province. 
Many people were killed during clashes with security forces, and more than a 
thousand people were imprisoned. Although Albanians in Macedonia sympathized 
with the cause of the Albanians in Kosova, no serious political disturbance occurred 
in Macedonia. The situation had remained calm during the demonstration in Kosova, 
and only later in June there were reports that insurrectionary literature was being 
distributed and Albanians were involved in activities like sloganeering. Reports 
pointed to small scale activities, which showed that the majority of the Albanian
Duncan Perry, “Macedonia”, RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 3, No. 16, 22 April 1994, p. 84. 
Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, p. 17.
Ana Triandaiyllidou, “National Identity and the Other”, Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 21. No. 4. 
July 1998, pp. 601-3.
population had remained passive.^' Nevertheless, the Macedonian authorities seized 
the opportunity provided by the campaign against Albanian nationalism to roll back 
the educational and cultural rights of Albanians in Macedonia, and to further 
marginalise them. Actually, the policies of the ‘Serbophile Macedonian leadership’ 
were even more repressive than those implemented in Kosova. Under a policy 
known as ‘differentiation’, Albanian teachers and officials were dismissed, some of 
them for attending weddings where nationalist songs were sung.
The Albanian language was in particular targeted. In 1985 a law was passed 
stipulating that ‘secondary school classes with Albanian as language of instruction 
could only be created if more than thirty pupils enrolled for the class’. Otherwise 
Albanians were obliged to attend Macedonian language classes. As a result of this the 
number of Albanian pupils following secondary education dropped sharply from 
8,200 in 1981 to 4,221 in 1989. In 1987 the Albanian language section at the 
Pedagogical faculty in Skopje was also closed down. Against these and other 
measures, demonstrations were held by Albanians in August and October 1988, 
supporting the 1974 constitutional rights. Among those imprisoned for participating in 
the protests were four pupils aged sixteen and seventeen which received sentences
23between four and six years.
The Macedonian authorities could not take such drastic measures without the 
support of Belgrade. Macedonians had greeted the rise of Milosevic in Serbia, and the 
two republics coordinated their anti-Albanian campaign. In 1989 while Serbia 
adopted amendments that abolished Kosova’s autonomy, Macedonia, too, changed its
Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1992, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992, pp. 196-7. Isa Blumi, “Tlie Question of Identity, Diplomacy, and llie 
Albanians in Macedonia”,
Misha Glenny, “The Macedonian Question: Still No Answer”, Social Research, Vol. 62, No. 1, 
Spring 1995, p. 147.
Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, pp. 127-132.
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constitution redefining the state as ‘a national state of the Macedonian people’.^ "* With 
this last point in mind, we will look at the relationship between Albanians in Kosova 
and Macedonia.
1.2.1. The Relationship Between the Albanians of Kosova and Macedonia
As Hough Poulton puts it; “..the situation in Kosova is always closely watched 
by all Albanians in Macedonia and often an important pointer to future action in the 
republic. Based on such an understanding of inter-Albanian relations many 
regional analysts have developed what we can call ‘a quasi-automatic relationship’ 
between the two groups. ‘An explosion in one area will instantly radicalize the 
other.’“  However, this yvay of reasoning is deeply flawed because it removes the 
action of Albanians in Macedonia from its historical context. It overlooks the 
differences between the two communities and it is not supported by historical facts.
In November 1968 massive demonstrations broke out in Prishtina, followed 
almost a month later by similar ones in Tetova, demanding that Albanian inhabited 
areas of Macedonia join Kosova in a seventh republic. It is important to note that 
Albanians whether in Kosova or Macedonia had gone through the same repressive 
policies of the Rankovic era. As a consequence their protest should not be seen as 
simply ‘inspired’ by events in Kosova, but primarily as a reaction to their conditions 
in Macedonia. As we already showed, in stark contrast to the magnitude o f the 
demonstrations in Kosova in March-April 1981, which had necessitated the 
intervention of the army no serious political disturbance occurred in Macedonia. The
Elez BiberaJ,/l/ia/i/o in Transition, Westview Press, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers. 1998, 
p. 256. Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia, p. 233.
Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, p. 133.
Vanni Capelli, “The Macedonian Question. .. Again”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, Issue 3. 
Summer 1998
Blumi, “The Question of Identity, Diplomacy, and Albanians in Macedonia”,
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demonstrations that were held in 1988 in Macedonia, reflected purely local 
conditions, and were not preceded by anything similar in Kosova. Following the 
abolition of autonomy in 1989, massive demonstrations were staged in Kosova, 
however, the situation in Macedonia had remained relatively calm.^* Surprisingly 
enough, there was a strong cooperation between Belgrade and Skopje, but not 
between Prishtina and Tetova.
Hough Poulton explains the lack of major inter-ethnic incidents in Macedonia 
by pointing to the ‘political relaxation that allowed Albanians to organize openly. 
However, multiparty system was legalized in Serbia too, in August 1990, and 
elections were held in December. But Albanians of Kosova boycotted Serbia’s 
political system, and independence of Kosova was declared as the only legitimate 
goal. In contrast, the Albanians in Macedonia by participating in the political life 
showed that they were following their own local agenda. This last development 
clearly indicated the differences between Albanians in Kosova and Macedonia, and 
the political realities they face.
1.3. Society
The Macedonian society is characterized by a severe ethnic divide. The 
Albanians and Macedonians are set apart primarily by language, culture, and religion. 
In addition to these determinant components of identity, other factors of a more recent 
origin work toward widening the division. Albanian society is more rural and 
traditional than the Macedonian one. The two groups are also separated by 
employment sector.^® Albanians have been working mainly in the agriculture sector or
^  Poultoa Who are the Macedonians, p. 133 
Poulton, Who are..., p. 134.
30 Mickey and Albion,” Success in the Balkans? A Case Study of Ethnic Relations in the Republic of 
Macedonia”, p. 74.
12
running their small businesses, whereas Macedonians were employed mainly in the 
state institutions, and what was known during communist time, as ‘socially owned 
enterprises’. While Albanians in the Communist era were a marginalised minority, 
and continue still to be second class citizens in many respects, Macedonians were and 
are the titular nation. The separation is further reinforced by the territorial 
compactness o f Albanians in the north-west of the country.
There is very little interaction between the two groups and the inter-ethnic 
marriages are almost non-existent. While most Albanians speak Macedonian, 
Macedonians, by virtue of their dominant position in the state and the way how the 
society function do not speak Albanian. Thus the lack of knowledge about Albanians 
adds to the Macedonians’ fears and mistrust.^* This is also revealed by the fact that 
Macedonians are more ‘burdened’ with prejudices against Albanians.^^ Since 
governmental and non-governmental institutions are heavily occupied by 
Macedonians their attitudes toward Albanians are crucial to understand the pace and 
degree to which the latter would be integrated in the system.
According to the cultural pluralism theory that sees ‘cultural differences as 
engendering ethnic conflict’^ ,^ and the myth of ancient ethnic rivalries that was 
adopted by the bulk of Western policy makers, journalists and academics toward 
crisis in the Balkans,^'* Macedonia should have turned long ago into an ethnic 
nightmare. However, Macedonia has not experienced ethnic conflict.
Periods of regime transition are associated with political turbulence, economic 
collapse and increased anxiety about the future. In addition, Balkans states, and
Duncan Perry, “Destiny on Hold: Macedonia and the Dangers of Etimic Discord”, Current History, 
March 1998, p.l20.
Emilja Simoska, “Macedonia: A View on the Inter-ethnic Relations”, Perceptions, Journal o f  
International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, June-August 1997, p. 98. “Work-Shop on Inter-etluiic dialogue, 
held in Tetova”,yli.BP7?£'S5 news agency, Bulletin 24, Skopje, 15 December 1998.
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Ethnic, Berkley: University Press, 1985, p. 136.
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Macedonia more so, had to confront also the threat of a spill over of the conflict in 
Yugoslavia. All these factors, undoubtedly, would bear upon inter-ethnic relations. 
Yet ethnic tension in Macedonia is not a recent phenomena.^^ The existence of ethnic 
tensions and incidents in multiethnic environments is not something unusual,^^ and 
the societies that are ethnically divided ‘learn’ how to get along with a certain degree 
of tension. Thus what to an outsider might appear as a transitional phase in interethnic 
relations, approaching the coming clash, it is in fact nothing else but the state of 
affairs that the inhabitants of the region have known for generations. As Ferid Muhic 
argues: “Contrary to the dominant interpretation, the problem is not how to integrate 
Macedonia, as a multiethnic community, but how to prevent its disintegration.” *^
The lack of conflict in Macedonia serves to understand better certain aspects 
of inter-ethnic relations and dynamics. It shows that the lack of ‘conflict-dampening’ 
inter-ethnic marriages and friendships and cultural closeness between ethnic groups 
should not be exaggerated because their presence in other countries were no guarantee 
for the prevention of bloody conflicts.^^ Bosnia provides a perfect example of this. 
Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs are ethnic Slavs, speak the same language and shared 
more or less a common way of life. The cultural differences between these three 
groups appear insignificant in comparison to the differences between Albanians and 
Macedonians.
The weakness of the cultural pluralism theory lies in the fact that “tends to 
denigrate the role of political variables, envisioning the interaction of whole cultural
Sabrina Ramet, Whose Democracy, RowMan & LittleField, 1997, p. 4. The author argues that the 
‘West has tried to cover its tracks by concocting and promulgating the myth of ethnic rivalries.
Robert Hislope, “Ethnic Conflict and the “Generosity Moment”, Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 
1, January 1998, p. 141.
Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, p. 133.
Troebst, “Macedonia; Powder Keg Defused?” pp. 38-9.
Ferid Muhic, “Macedonia, -  an Island on the Balkan Mainland”, in David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, 
(eds.) Yugoslavia ondAfler. Longman, London and New York, 1996, p. 242.
Emilija Simoska, “Macedonia: A View on the Inter-ethnic Relations”, Perceptions, p. 101.
14
sections in a leaderless fashion.”^^  The accommodation that can be reached by the 
political elites is indispensable for the maintenance of stability in the society. As 
Misha Glenny notes that the conflict in Bosnia started because of the breakdown in 
the political communication between the three communities, and not as a result o f a 
breakdown in social relations."**
We will look at the dynamics of ethnic politics later on in the chapter, at this 
point it is important to look at one factor; the degree of autonomy that elites enjoy 
from the public pressure. The space that politicians have to make compromises and 
reach settlements is partly dependent on this variable."*  ^ By and large Albanians are 
less active in politics than Macedonians. Albanians are less educated and the share of 
rural population (or recently moved people to the urban areas) is larger among them. 
Due to their heavy representation in state institutions and public sectors Macedonians 
are more involved in politics and more sensitive to the developments in the society.
Another important section of the multiethnic society that deserves special 
focus is the class of intellectuals. “The intellectual whether writer, artist, or politician, 
is the one who articulates grievances, formulates nationalistic statements, and 
translates popular belief into a coherent strategy.”"*^ The state of inter-ethnic relations 
is a very good indicator of general progress made toward achieving a civil society. 
However the pattern of the relationship in this group exhibits the same characteristics 
as those of the rest of the society. The consensus on values and norms is weak and 
almost everything is regarded from an ethnic angle. The strong opposition of the 
University lecturers, and students to the introduction of the minority languages in the
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 137-9.
Glenny, “The Macedonian Question Still No Answer”, Social Research, p. 149.
M. Burton, R. Gunther, J. Higley, “Introduction”, in Higley and et al. (eds.;, Elites and Democratic 
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 18-21.
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Pedagogical faculty in Skopje clearly demonstrates this.'''’ In the same line, non­
governmental organizations and forums like the Macedonian Writers’ Union, 
women’s associations or human rights groups have split in two or ‘function in 
ethnically separated groups, each of which defends its own.’ In other institutions like 
the Academy of Science and Arts, and in the majority of state institutions Albanians 
are not represented at all, or only symbolically.''*
The attitude of the Macedonians toward Albanians and their demands is 
greatly influenced by the legacy of the communist period. As we noted earlier control 
of the state institutions was seen as crucial in order to strengthen the Macedonian 
national consciousness. During this period no tradition of cooperation, that is, a 
Macedonian sharing an office with an Albanian, was established. Therefore, present 
Albanian demands for greater representation are seen as threatening the (dis)balance 
that exists in ethnic relations and the very foundations of the Macedonian state. 
Prejudice toward Albanians, combined with the fact that Albanians that are graduates 
of Prishtina University are seen as being more hard line and less sensitive to the 
Macedonians concerns'*^ also make difficult the communication. Moreover, greater 
participation of the Albanians in the state and other organizations would threaten the 
privileges of this section of the Macedonian society. That is why, governmental 
policies, known as ‘affirmative action’ aiming at improving the general status of the 
Albanians could provoke a backlash among the Macedonians.
Anya Peterson Royce, “Etlmicity, Nationalism, and the Role of tlie Intellectual”, in Judith Toland 
(ed.). Ethnicity and the State, Political and Legal Anthropology Vol. 9, Transaction Publisher, New 
Brunswick and London, 1993, p. 103.
Duncam Perry, “The Republic of Macedonia: finding its way”, in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, 
(eds.). Politics, Power and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, 1997, p. 259.
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History o f ethnic relations. The collective experience of a group plays an 
important role in shaping the perceptions and responses toward ‘the other.’ Thus, the 
state of inter-ethnic relations depends partly on the size of the crimes committed in the 
past. A number of variables intervene, however, in-between the past and the present 
conduct. ‘To whom responsibility for past crimes is attached. The coincidence 
between power and victimhood, and the present conduct of the authorities.’'*’
Until after the Second World War, due to the historical circumstances under 
which both Albanians and Macedonians went through there is no negative experience.
Similar to the geographic region of Macedonia, Albanian inhabited territories were
■ ■
partitioned during the Balkan Wars. During the inter-war period both groups were 
ruthlessly suppressed by the Yugoslav state, which was trying to Serbianize them. 
This period also witnessed cooperation between Albanian kacaks and Macedonian 
komitas. Moreover the Albanian state did not try to assimilate the small Macedonian 
minority living in Albania as Greece or Serbia did.'**
After the Second World War the relationship between the groups changed 
radically. In the SFR of Macedonia Albanians continued to be an oppressed minority. 
However, until 1966 the hostile policies of the Yugoslav state were attributed to 
Rankovic. Starting from 1981, as we showed earlier, the discrimination towards them 
became pronounced. The move of the Albanians for territorial autonomy in 1992 is 
partly a consequence of this period.'*’ Yet the repressive policies of 1980s did not 
involve mass murder, ethnic cleansing and other atrocities that were committed
1.3.1. Factors that may Condition Ethnic Conflict
Kim Mehmeti, “Disappearing Democracy”, War Report, No. 41, May 1996, p. 37.
^  “Work-Shop on Inter-ethnic Dialogue”, ^ ¿¿PRESS', 24 Bulletin, 15 December 1998.
Stephen Van Evera, “Hypothesis on Nationalism and War”, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, 
Spring 1994, pp. 23-5. Robert Hislope, “Etlmic Conflict and tlie Generosity Movement”, Journal o f  
Democracy, p. 148.
Poulton, Who are the Macedonians, p. 79.
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against Albanians in Kosova or Bosnians by Serbs. With the break up o f Yugoslavia 
the repression of Albanians abated, and the likelihood for a conflict between the two 
groups was no longer. Albanians were not in a position to take revenge for the 
discrimination they had suffered, on the other hand, Macedonians too, were no longer 
able to carry on with the same policies. A kind of pragmatism or moderation, as we 
may call it, has been imposed on them by the new circumstances. This is one reason 
why some Albanians tend to view the Macedonians as equal to Serbs who merely lack 
the power but not the predisposition to rule over them.
By and large we could say that the history of ethnic relations in Macedonia 
provides more space for accommodation than other cases in the Balkans, and that the 
future of this relations depends on the current and future behavior of the authorities.^®
Pattern o f ethnic mixing. “Ethnic groups can be intermingled on a regional 
scale (regions are heterogeneous but small communities are homogeneous) or they 
could be mixed even in a local scale. Regional intermingling is easily managed 
because inter-group relations can be negotiated by the elites. In contrast elites can lose 
control of the events when the intermingling extends to the local level. Conflicts can 
flare up when unofficial killers seize the agenda by sparking a spiral of private 
violence.” *^
Albanian inhabited areas in north-western part of the country form a compact 
unit, with rural areas exhibiting a greater degree of homogeneity than the urban 
ones.^^ Even in the cities Albanians and Macedonians tend to live in separate quarters. 
Moreover a slow process of homogenization is being noticed in ethnically mixed
Patrick Moore, “The Albanian Question in the Former Yugoslavia”, RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 
1, No. 14, 3 April 1992, p. 12.
Mickey and Albion, “Success in the Balkans? A Case Study of Ethnic Relations in tlie Republic of 
Macedonia”, p. 58.
Stephen Van Evera, “Hypothesis on Nationalism and Wai ’^, p. 19.
Poulton, IVho are the Macedonians, p. 125.
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areas, with people preferring to live in neighborhoods with people of the same ethnic
• * 5 3origin. Lack of communication between the two groups seems to be the reason 
behind this. In short, the structure of ethnic distribution is not conducive to conflicts.
1.4. Economy
Over the past half century Albanians have worked primarily in the agricultural 
sector, and have turned to the private sector due to the inability to find posts in the 
state and public sector. Albanian families have also relied on the remittances of their 
sons working in Croatia, Slovenia. In contrast to Albanians Macedonians, which 
compose 65 percent of the population represented between 80-85 percent of the 
employed in public sector and state administration (this ratio still remains). The 
ethnic division of labor shaped social mobility in the society according to the 
opportunities that were open for each group.^^ Many educated Albanians from 
Macedonia used to go to Kosova to find jobs that reflected their background, despite 
under-representation of Albanians in Macedonia.
Albanians’ involvement in the private sector prior to the regime change, and 
the accumulation of wealth independently from government connections and policies 
made the transition period less painful for them, because they did not face the same 
economic problems like Macedonians; unemployment, and unpaid wages.^^ However, 
apart from this benefit, the lack o f integration in the Macedonian economic structure 
during the communist time carried its costs too, as was shown during the privatization 
process.
International Crisis Group (ICG) Report: Macedonia: The Albanian Question in Macedonia 11/08/98 
a twww.intl-crisis-group.org/proJects/
^  Lujiza Ismaili and Mirce Jovanovski, “Putting Profits over Politics”, in The New Accommodation, 
available at www.iwpr.net/special/
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 111.
Ismaili and Jovanovski, “Putting Profits over Politics”.
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Economic transformation and especially the process of privatization opened 
opportunities for integrating Albanians in the system and increasing their stakes in the 
welfare of the country. However, due to the privatization strategy that was followed 
Albanians were left out of the process. The federal privatization law that was passed 
in 1989 and remained in force until August 1991, the new privatization law that was 
passed in 1993, and several other practices that developed during the implementation 
process, like giving management teams special concessions etc., made impossible 
participation for outsiders.*’ Although the privatization scheme was not aimed at 
discriminating against the Albanians, and it was criticized by different sections o f the 
Macedonian society, at the end it resulted in Albanians’ exclusion from it. Only 4.7 
percent of the Albanians shared the benefits, indicating the degree to which the 
Albanians were employed in the public sector. However, a new law that has passed 
makes now possible the transfer o f the ownership of the shares.*®
Despite the exclusion of the Albanians from the privatization process, and 
refusal of Macedonians to hire Albanians, the economic issues have not appeared in 
the politics of ethnic relations, and the transformation of the economy has proceeded 
without preconditions by Albanians. *^  Part of the answer lies in the fact that no 
feeling of relative deprivation has grown among Albanians. Albanians are very 
successful in what some analysts have called a ‘second’ economy where ‘they are 
thought to draw their considerable entrepreneurial skills.’*’®
”  Trajko Slaveski, “Privatising Socially Owned Capital”, Transition, Vol. 2, No. 24,29 November, 
1996, pp. 46-9.
Ismaili and Jovanovski, “Putting Profits over Politics”.
Ismaili and Jovanovski, “Putting Profits over Politics”.
® Mickey and Albion, “Success in the Balkans? A Case Study of Ethnic Relations in tlie Republic of 
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Despite the improved bargaining position of the Albanians in the independent 
Macedonia,®* their position vis-a-vis Macedonians and the state has remained almost 
unchanged from the communist era. A number of factors ranging from group qualities 
to factors emanating from the regional context and the attitude adopted by the West 
account for this. It is to the study of these factors and the way they interacted that we 
now turn. The whole state structure of the independent Macedonia reflects two major 
concerns that have been present since the establishment of the SFR of Macedonia, the 
need to affirm their nation by monopolizing control of the state and the ‘creation of 
political structures that have institutionalized the high level of mistrust between the 
ethnic groups.’®^
The threatening regional environment in which Macedonians found 
themselves combined with Albanian demands for greater rights only helped to 
amplify their fears. Yet, many analysts tend to agree that the ethnic dimension has 
emerged as the most important variable in the ‘country’s calculus for survival’, and it 
is only through the collapse of inter-ethnic relations that the external threat could 
become real.®  ^ However, the Macedonians did not try to develop a healthy 
partnership with the Albanians. The relationship was based on realpolitik 
considerations. According to this, concessions would be made not out of consensus 
between the two groups on the future of the state, or adherence to minority rights, but 
because of power-politics calculations. This approach leaves space for halting the
1.5. The Dynamics of Ethnic Politics
Robert Austin, “Albanian-Macedonian Relations: Confrontation or Cooperation”, RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol. 2, No. 42, 22 October 1993, p. 22.
Kim Mehmeti, “Separate Dreams”, War Report, No. 58, February-March, 1998, p. 58.
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granting of rights or even rolling it back if the political environment makes such a 
move possible. '^*
Bringing of the Albanians in the government headed by Crvenkovski in 1992, 
was one such concession. Participation of the Albanians in the cabinet was deemed 
necessary to provide the country with stability and to prevent moves by Albanians to 
build parallel structures or demand territorial autonomy. But more importantly, the 
move was meant to increase the legitimacy of the Macedonian government, and to 
win the Western support. The positive effect that the inclusion of the Albanians in 
government had on inter-ethnic relations notwithstanding, the subsequent behavior of 
the Macedonian politicians indicated that they did not have any intention to 
effectively share power with the Albanians. The Albanians complain that their 
participation in the government is largely symbolic. The ministries that they directed 
were ‘the least influential; culture, development, labor and social policy’ and the 
number of Albanians employed in these ministries is almost non-existent. In addition, 
Albanian ministers complain that their views most of the time are not taken in 
consideration during cabinet discussions.^^ The unwillingness of Macedonians to 
effectively integrate the Albanians showed that the way they look at the Macedonian 
state has not changed from the communist period. The Macedonian state was 
equalized with a strong Macedonian ethnos at the expense of the Albanian one.“
The Macedonian leadership was very successful in creating the image of a 
young democratic government that is threatened by the Albanian nationalists that
Alexander Konovalov and Dimiui Evstafief, “The Problem of Minority Rights and Protection in tlie 
Newly Independent States”, in Cutliberston and Leibowitz (eds.), Minorities: The New Europe's Old 
Issue, Institute For EastWest Studies, 1993, p. 170.
“  Robert Mickey, “Citizenship, Status, and Minority Political Participation: The evidence from tlie 
Republic of Macedonia”, in Gerd Nonneman, Tim Niblock, and Bogdan Szajkowski (eds.), Muslim 
Communities in the New Europe, lUiaca Press, 1996, p. 66.
^  Duncan Perry, “The Republic of Macedonia: finding its way”, p. 273.
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want to secede, and hostile neighbors, in order to gain Western support, which has 
resulted in a toughened stance and harsh treatment of Albanians.^^
The government of Crvenkovski has found different excuses to avoid 
addressing Albanian demands. It asks for time because of the financial constrains, or 
it points at the pressure from the Macedonian nationalist that prevents the government 
from taking certain steps. But in the majority of cases it refuses to recognize Albanian 
demands on the grounds that if implemented they would undermine the unitary nature 
of the state and prepare the conditions for the Albanian secession. To justify this 
claim it often makes reference to the referendum for territorial autonomy that 
Albanians held in January 1992, and the arms affair. The factors that brought to the 
referendum will be analyzed later.
In November 1993 Macedonian authorities announced that they had 
uncovered an Albanian plot, and a group of seven Albanians, including the deputy 
Defense Minister, were arrested, on the charges that they had created a paramilitary 
organization and smuggled weapons from Albania. Shortly afterwards, the 
Macedonian Interior Minister and Albanian Defense Minister played down the story. 
‘Ethnic Albanian politicians did not deny that plans existed, but claimed that these 
plans were made with Gligorov’s approval as both Albanians and Macedonians were 
taking precautions against potential confrontation with Serbia.’®* The Albanians saw 
the affair as a ‘governmental hoax’ to be used as justification to move against them, 
and ‘if not to suspend rights certainly not having to enhance them.’®’
However, if we look at the Albanian demands we notice that they are aimed at 
improving the status of Albanians within the system, rather than creating parallel
Kim Mehmeti, “Disappearing Democracy”, War Report, No. 41, May 1996, p. 37. Katerina 
Blazevska and Kim Mehmeti, “Steering Through tlie Regional Troubles”, in The New Accommodation, 
Elez Bibcraj, Albania in Transition, Westview Press, 1998, pp. 257-58.
69 Duncan Perry, “Macedonia”, p. 84.
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structures as Macedonians claim.™ The demand of Albanians for an Albanian 
language university is closely linked to Albanians’ demands for greater representation 
in the state institutions. It is difficult to see how greater participation can lead to 
parallel structures. The same thing can be said about the demand for greater 
decentralization of power at the local level. Some devolution of power to the local 
level will dissuade Albanians from asking for territorial autonomy.^' It is difficult to 
see how the Macedonians expect to enhance the legitimacy of the state without 
increasing the integration of Albanians in the system.
Another aspect of the relations between the state and ethnic Albanians that 
deserves special attention is the composition and the excessive use of force used by 
the security forces toward the Albanians. Not only Macedonia but other countries in 
the region use the police for political aims. In the case of Macedonia police are 
frequently used against the Albanians and other minorities. In three events police 
actions reached their climax. In the ‘Bit Pazar’ event when police killed three 
Albanian and one Macedonian though none of them was armed. In February police 
crackdown on the Albanian language university left one dead and several injured. 
While clashes with demonstrators in July 1997 over the removal of Albanian and 
Turkish flags from the city hall of Gostivar left three dead and many others wounded.
In cases when the security forces are controlled by one ethnic group there is a 
greater likelihood that police would use excessive force, and efforts to impose order 
even in cases that are not connected to political issues will raise questions of whose 
law and order. Experience from other countries show that “over-representation of
™ Fred Abrahams, “The rhetoric of extremism is dead, and with no help from tlie West, the 
Macedonian electorate lias learned a crucial lesson in democracy”, in The New Accommodation,
’’ See for more details; Barnett Rubin, Toward Comprehensive Peace in SoulhEast Europe, The 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1996.
S. Krause, D. lonescu, S. Markotich, P. Moore, F. Schmidt, “Balkan Police Forces More Loyal to the 
Leaders than to the Laws”, Transition, Vol. 2, No. 5 ,8  March 1996, pp. 19-20.
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‘heartland’ ethnic group in the security forces opens the government to rebellion by 
minority groups.”’^
Even in the Albanian inhabited areas of north-western Macedonia the 
Macedonian element dominates the security forces. This fact apart from illustrating 
once more that the Macedonian state works as a nation-state, points also to another 
thing. To destabilise Macedonia the Albanians do not need to create paramilitary 
groups twice thé size of the Macedonian army. In the fashion of KLA in Kosova small 
groups o f Albanians would be sufficient to destabilize Macedonia by starting to attack 
security forces in Albanian populated areas. The fact that this has not happened, 
despite the fact that Albanian demands have not been met and the use of police like in 
the case of the university or the removal o f the flag has been brutal, substantiates the 
observation that ‘Macedonian Albanians themselves show no inclination for ethnic 
warfare.
So by the end of 1998 the situation of Albanians had not changed much from 
the time of Macedonia’s independence and ‘Albanians feel that they have been used 
by Macedonians to create a Macedonian state.
The explanation that the danger of conflict in the Balkans and Macedonians’ 
own insecurities were not conducive to the expansion of the Albanians rights’*’, might 
sound plausible for the early 1990s but fails to explain the subsequent period, the 
signing of the interim agreement with Greece in October 1995 that opened the way for 
Macedonia’s membership to OSCE, Council of Europe, Partnership for Peace 
program. Moreover, with the end of the Bosnian war and the presence of NATO
Angela Burger, “Ethnicity and the Security Forces of the State: The Soutli Asian Experience”, in 
Toland (ed.) Ethnicity and the State, pp. 79-101.
Troebst, “Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused?” p. 39.
”  Mehmeti, “Separate Dreams”, p. 58.
Sabrina Ramet, “The Macedonian Enigma”, in Ramet and Adramovich (eds.) Beyond Yugoslavia, 
Westview Press, San Promusa, 1995, pp. 228-29.
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troops there, and the recognition of Macedonia by rump Yugoslavia with its 
constitutional name in April 1996, Macedonia’s position was strengthened. Despite all 
this, the Macedonians were not induced to address Albanian grievances. On the 
contrary, as some analysts pointed, the new confidence of the Macedonian authorities 
resulted in a hardened position toward the Albanians.’’
If the Macedonians’ unwillingness to share power with the Albanians has its 
roots in the Macedonian nation-building process, and in their antipathy against the 
Albanian, their ability to prevail until now can only be explained in the framework of 
power politics. That is why we need to look at the other two actors in the scene, the 
Albanians of Macedonia and the Western countries. When the cleavage between the 
ethnic groups is severe we can look at inter-ethnic relations as diplomatic relations.’* 
The ability of the Macedonians to dominate state politics is directly linked to 
the weaknesses of the Albanian community in Macedonia,’  ^ The Albanians of 
Macedonia because of their size and administrative division from Kosova have never 
had the chance not only to govern themselves, like the Albanians in Kosova, but also 
to achieve some degree of representation in state institutions, which would have 
created an experienced class of people in all walks of life. During Yugoslavia 
Albanians of Macedonia have mainly benefited from the rights that were won as a 
result of the Albanians of Kosova struggle with the state. Due to the lack of public 
achievements there is a lack of confidence among the Albanians of Macedonia.*® The 
latter have also a tradition of working within the state structures of the republic.
”  BihiiA], Albania in Transition, p. 260. Bliuni, “Tlie Question of Identity, Diplomacy and Albanians 
in Macedonia”.
David Welsh, “Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict”, in Michael Brown (ed.) Ethnic Conflict and 
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Leo Tindemans et al. (eds.). Unfinished Peace. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996,
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despite their under representation. At this point it is important to explain the causes 
that led to the referendum for territorial autonomy.
The rise of the Macedonian nationalism in the 1980s and the repressive 
policies implemented by the authorities reached the point of pushing the Albanians in 
the direction of separatism and secession. The ratification of the constitution that 
made the Albanians one of the several tolerated minorities further increased their 
alienation within the state.*’ The Constitutional definition of the ‘state as a nation 
state of the Macedonian people’ was used by the Macedonians to object to the 
Albanians’ demands in the fields of education, use of Albanian language in official 
matters, national symbols, citizenship law, etc.*  ^Besides the lack of representation in 
the central government, Macedonian authorities did not allow the Tetova municipal 
government to take office for sixteen moths. It was finally allowed in the middle of 
1992, after Albanians had held the referendum. In addition during periods in which 
the shape of the new state looks as if it is being set once and forever the 
apprehensions are likely to grow.
Thus it is in this context that we should look at the not well-thought and 
planned initiative for territorial autonomy which failed to materialize because of the 
Albanians themselves. The Council of Albanian political Parties in former Yugoslavia 
decided that autonomy would be an option should other efforts to gain equal rights 
fail.*'’ Albania too, did not endorse the referendum, afraid that this would trigger 
Serbian intervention. Another major factor that brought the failure was the lack of a 
unified and capable leadership of Albanians in Macedonia and disagreements within
Patrick Moore, “The Albanian Question in tlic Former Yugoslavia" RFE/RL Research Reports, p. 12. 
Mickey, “Citizenship, Status, and Minority Political Participation: The Evidence from the Republic 
of Macedonia", pp. 61-66.
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Fabian Schmidt, “From National Consensus to Pluralism", Transition, Vol. 1, No. 4, 29 March 1995,
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the community.*^ Even in this case the reasons that brought the Albanians to the 
referendum were local in nature.
A few months later the Albanian parties of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and 
National Democratic Party (NDP) entered the new cabinet of Cervenkovski. Despite 
the fact that the Albanian demand for a constituent nation status was not meet they 
agreed to work within the state thus helping to stabilize Macedonia.*^ Although PDP 
several times threatened to leave the government, due to the latter’s stance on several 
important ethnic issues like education and citizenship laws, it never left it. However, 
this attitude o f PDP came under attack from the Democratic Party of the Albanian 
(DPA) a splinter group from PDP. Participation in the government without being able 
to extract concessions regarding the Albanian demands helped only to bolster the 
image of Crvenkovski led government and weaken the Albanian side. Some viewed 
the Albanian participation in the government as amounting to nothing more but mere 
cooptation.*’ The developments that followed 1994 elections are very telling. After 
the first round the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Party (IMRO-DMNU) and 
Democratic Party (DP) withdrew from the elections accusing the government for 
manipulation. Thus the election outcome undermined, to a certain extent, the 
legitimacy of the new government, which was again led by Crvenkovski’s Social 
Democratic Alliance (SDMU). Moreover, on February 1996 Crvenkovski announced 
the formation of a new government that excluded Liberal Party (LP). In order to give 
the image of a broad representation the number of Albanians in the cabinet was 
increased.** At a very critical point when the government was suffering from a
Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p. 257. Moore, “The Albanian Question in tlie Former Yugoslavia” 
p. 13.
Schmidt, “From National Consensus to Pluralism”, p. 27.
Daut Dauti, “Cooperation or Cooptation”, War Report, No. 41, May 1996, p. 38.
88 ,' Petty, “The Republic of Macedonia: finding its way”, pp. 235-38.
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legitimacy crisis the PDP was unable to gain any concessions but just some more 
portfolios.
However, we want be able to understand the real dynamics at work if we try to 
explain the process only in terms of a weak Albanian leadership inclined toward 
personal aggrandizement. As two journalists from Macedonia pointed out “the 
governing coalition held out throughout its second term with strong encouragement 
from the international community.” ®^ The attitude adopted by the USA and other 
West European countries tilted the balance further in favor of Macedonians.
The international community was interested in preventing the Yugoslav wars 
to spread southward, and maintaining the security of Macedonia was seen as the key 
to the stability of the southern Balkans. Hence priority was given to the promotion of 
stability over other considerations such as democracy, human rights, pace of reform 
etc., which was indicated by the constant and uncritical backing of the government of 
Crvenkovski and his SDMU by the West and the US, in particular.’ ’
Thus stability was equalized with the maintenance of the status-quo in the 
domestic power configuration. Thus Gligorov and the Social Democrats, which were 
seen as moderate forces,’  ^became West’s partners in maintaining stability. The other 
political parties, such as IMRO-DPMNE and DPA that were in opposition and 
criticized the government were labeled as nationalist and radical. In line with this 
attitude the West has overlooked the highly undemocratic pressures on DPA, or the 
election irregularities in the 1994 elections.”  Similarly no pressure was brought to 
bear on the Government, regarding the question of the University o f Tetova, though
Dauti, “Cooperation or Cooptation”, p. 38.
^  Georgi Barbarovski and Daut Dauti, “Macedonia Votes for Change”, in Tfie New Accommodation.
Abrahams, “The Rhetoric of Extremism is Dead and...” in The New Accommodation.
^  Shea, Macedonia and Greece, p. 246.
Janes Pettifer, “Macedonia; Still the Apple of Discord”, World Today, Vol. 51, No. 3, March 1995, 
pp. 55-7.
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the right of Albanians to have higher education in their own language was enshrined 
in various international conventions signed by Macedonia. International community 
also failed to criticize the excessive use of force by the Macedonian police -  when 
Albanian and Turkish flags were removed - that left three people dead and about 400 
wounded, according to the ICG report. '^*
The view that the Western policy makers adopted was that the main threat to 
Macedonian security was external and not internal. The logic behind this was that 
internal instability could have provoked outside intervention by the neighboring 
countries. So as the position of Crvenkovski-led government strengthened that of 
Albanians weakened.
As we mentioned earlier the Albanian state and the Kosovar leadership did not 
endorse the referendum for autonomy and time after time stressed that Albanians 
should work within the state institutions, and that a stable Macedonia was in 
Albanians interests. Albanians interests aside, the West’s strong support for 
Macedonia served the same purpose. Consequently, the political space to manoeuvre 
for the Albanians of Macedonia narrowed significantly. Under such conditions the 
Albanians were disposed of all the leverages that they could have used to force 
Macedonians to reach an accommodation. The practice of Albanian deputies to walk 
out o f the Parliament on important issues they knew that they would be outvoted, and 
later to join the parliament again very well illustrates the alienation and feeling of 
powerlessness among them.
Thus the advantageous position of ethnic Macedonians in the state, reflecting 
their status in former Yugoslavia, combined with a politically weak Albanian
ICG Report: Macedonia: the Politics of Etlinicity and Conflict. 21/10/97, at www.intl-crisis- 
group.org/proJects.
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community and the attitude adopted by the West explain why the status of the 
Albanians did not improve.
1.5.1. Confínes of Ethnic Politics
The outcome o f the interaction that we mentioned above is not static and 
changes in the actors action would bring about a change in the outcome as well.
The weakness of the Albanian community is not immutable. We could say that 
the Albanian community in Macedonia has been undergoing change since the time of 
Macedonian independence. For the first time, the Albanians realised that they were 
potential players in Macedonian politics. Due to the opportunities provided by the 
transition to democracy, Albanians have participated in the countries political life in 
different capacities, such as cabinet members, deputies in parliament, city mayors, or 
even as simple party activists. All these are contributing to the formation of an 
Albanian political class. In addition, the economic strength of the Albanians in 
Macedonia has made possible the establishment of the University of Tetova, and the 
expansion of Albanian language media. Thus as a result of educational, cultural and 
economic advancements an intellectual class is emerging. And it is exactly on the 
strength of its educated elite that the political weight of a community depends. 
Experience from other cases shows that advancements of a community go hand in 
hand with a rising assertion of its nationalism and resentment of domination by 
others.^^ Although that resentment already exists among the Albanians, the latter’s
Emile Sahliye, “Etlinicity and State Building; The Case of the Palestinians in the Middle East”, in 
Toland (ed. ,^ Ethnicity and the State, p. 178.
Welsh, “Domestic Politics and Etlmic Conflict”, in Brown (cd.), Ethnic Conjlict and International 
Security, p. 50. Tire e.xample of Quebec, is provided, starting from early 1960s. The same phenomena is 
noticed in Kosova after the opening of the University of Prishtina, and other advancements made by the 
Albanians.
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development will increase its capacity to better capitalise on the space offered in the 
independent Macedonia.
The suggested changes do not occur overnight, but proceed rather slowly. 
However, the most important point is that the growing confidence and maturity o f 
Albanians in Macedonia will not be dependent on developments in Kosova and 
Albania, but it is an internal development. The attitude of the international community 
has undergone a change in recent months. The stability of Macedonia continues to be 
the principal concern, but the approach to achieve it has changed. While in the past 
the maintenance of the status-quo in the domestic scene was seen as the best way to 
preserve peace, now after the end of the Kosova crisis, and preponderant presence of 
NATO in the region, the US seems to have turned its attention toward a new 
accommodation in inter-ethnic relations. Analysts say that pressure is being exercised 
on Skopje to be more accommodative.^’ Part for the changes, should be attributed to 
the new governmental coalition composed of IMRO, DPA and the other two parties. 
The so-called nationalists have proven to be more accommodative and responsive 
than the previous cabinet that was supported be the West.
However, no matter how the dynamics of ethnic politics will shift in 
Macedonia, one crucial dimension of it has and will remain constant. Ethnic politics 
in Macedonia is confined within the borders of Macedonia and will not threaten its 
territorial integrity. And this is so not just because of the role played by the 
international community. In the second convention of IMRO Georgievski clearly 
declared that Macedonia without Albanians could not exist, and that there could be no 
legitimate government without the participation of the Albanians.’* It is this 
awareness on the part of the Macedonians that works toward avoiding radicalization
Dragan Nikolic, “Macedonia High Wire Act”, Balkan Crisis Report, No. 41, 2 June 1999.
^  Iso Rusi, Political Parties in Macedonia Wliat is Right and Wliat is Left?” AIM, Skopje, 4 June 1999.
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in the state. It is true that Gligorov did not to fulfil any of the Albanians’ demands. 
However, at the same time as we showed, the stability of Macedonia was not 
threatened as a result of the power configuration, that is why Gligorov did not see the 
need to make concessions to the Albanians. But in one case, when faced with the 
likelihood of radicalization he backed down. The attitude of the government toward 
the establishment of the University o f Tetova was clearly shown by the action of the 
police that destroyed parts of the building, and left one Albanian killed and several 
others wounded, as they were trying to protect the university, nine police were 
wounded as well.^^ However, faced with the possibility that the situation could have 
got out of control, due to the mobilization of Albanians in support of the University, 
the government backed down. While it did not recognize the university, it allowed it 
to function.
The same thing holds true for the Albanians. The political program of the 
Albanians is also confined within the borders of Macedonia, in the sense that they do 
not see their future outside it. As we will see in the subsequent chapters, there is no 
support for such a move either by Prishtina or Tirana, which is a sufficient condition 
in itself to preserve the stability of Macedonia. In addition, as we noted earlier the 
Albanians of Macedonia are not inclined toward ethnic warfare. In an ethnic conflict, 
whatever the outcome, the Albanians of Macedonia would stand to loose most. There 
is also another reason, though minor than the previous. As Horowitz says; “It is easier 
to understand elite behaviour on the basis of straightforward rational interests.”'®“ The 
political class of Albanians in Macedonia do not have any interests to see Macedonia 
dismember. They are important just because they are in Macedonia. If, hypothetically.
Schmidt, “From National Consensus To Pluralism”, p. 29. 
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 132.
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we assume that the Albanian inhabited areas in Macedonia would join Albania or 
Kosova, the political class o f Albanians in Macedonia would simply disappear.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SECURITY LINK BETWEEN KOSOVA AND MACEDONIA
2.1. The ‘Domino Theory’
With the question of Kosova’s status remaining unresolved rump Yugoslavia was 
inherently an unstable entity. Despite Albanian demands for independent statehood 
Serbia might have been able through constitutional arrangements similar to those of 1974 
to shift the political dynamics to her advantage. However, Serbian politicians squandered 
the opportunity offered to them by the peaceful resistance of Albanians in order to reach 
an accommodation. As a consequence of many factors that will be analyzed below, the 
Albanians abandoned their non-violent movement, and the war broke out between the 
Serbs and the Albanians in early 1998.
The attitude of the international community toward the conflict was similar to the 
one displayed at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis in 1990. Any solution to the Kosova 
question had to be found within the borders of rump Yugoslavia. Apart from the general 
reluctance that exists in the international community when it comes to the recognition of 
new states, the objections to the Kosova statehood were grounded on the fear that this 
would cause region-wide instability by undermining Macedonia and unraveling Dayton. 
The spillover from Kosova to Macedonia in particular occupied the Western policy 
makers thinking. War in Kosova was seen as jeopardizing Macedonian security under 
different scenarios. North-western Macedonia could become a theatre of military 
operations as a result of the area being used by Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) as a base
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from where to launch attacks. The latter, it was expected, would be supported by 
paramilitary formations o f Macedonian Albanians, and even the Albanian army, which 
would have resulted in armed incursions by Serbian troops. The existence of armed 
conflict in Kosova would radicalize the Albanians of Macedonia, which would seize the 
opportunity to raise against Macedonian government as well. Additionally, the conflict 
was expected to create a wave of hundreds of thousands of refugees that would flood into 
Macedonia and destabilize the country.'
As we can notice, the Albanians appeared as a destabilizing factor. Action in 
Prishtina would initiate a chain reaction by Albanians in Macedonia and Albania. It is in 
such an understanding of the developments that the contradictory attitude of the 
international community lied.^ While, on one hand, there was general agreement that the 
crisis in Kosova had to be defused, on the other there was caution that support for the 
Albanians might destabilize the region. This attitude was exemplified by the favorite 
statement o f the international community: ‘We do not support independence for Kosova, 
nor the continuation of the status quo.’ A vague statement that could lead nowhere. Its 
perceived effects on Macedonia prejudiced the resolution of the conflict in Kosova. What 
follows is a critique of the security relationship between Kosova and Macedonia as 
outlined above. The developments in Kosova will make this task easier. We start by 
examining the question of Kosova’s status since that is the crunch of the matter. It is on 
the question of independence or autonomy for Kosova that the rest of the debate is based.
' Jolm Shea, Macedonia And Greece, Macfarland, JefTerson, Norlli Carolina, 1997, pp. 320-321. Stephan 
Troebst, “Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused?”, pp. 35-36.
 ^Anthony Borden, “Kosovo Contradictions”, Balkan Crisis Reporting, No. 4, 26 February, 1999, at 
http://www. iwpr.net.
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2.2, Kosovâ: Autonomy or Independence
The Western countries and above all the US have said it clearly that they support 
substantial autonomy for Kosova within FRY. However, the real question is whether 
autonomy is a viable solution that will bring stability to FRY, and the Balkans.^ To 
answer this question we need to look at the history of Albanians within Yugoslavia.
2.2.1. Albanians’ Position in Yugoslavia During the Inter-war Period
Albanian history under Yugoslav rule has been marked by a succession of 
unsuccessful attempts to break off Yugoslavia. While Yugoslav approaches in dealing 
with the Albanians have alternated between deliberate attempts of forced assimilation and 
denationalization to granting them a degree of autonomy. Such pattern of relationship has 
developed as a result of the inability o f any side to bring a final solution. Although the 
Serbs were able to incorporate large ethnic Albanian territories, as the course of history 
showed, they could not do away with the Albanian question. The number of Albanians 
that was large and growing, with a well-developed national consciousness, combined 
with their regional compactness and homogeneity made sure that the Albanian question 
would continue to exists."* It is this reality that Serb and Yugoslav policies tried to change 
by employing every possible means. The atrocities committed by the Serb army as they 
conquered Kosova in 1912 during the course of the Balkan Wars, were not driven by 
ancient ethnic hatreds, and cannot be dismissed as mere side effects of the war. As
 ^Roy Gutman, “Tragedy of Errors”, Yew ^ epM6//c,Vol. 219, Issue 12,26 October 1998.
Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Itliaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 306.
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reported by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “Houses and whole 
villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent civilians massacred en masse, incredible 
acts of violence... such were the means employed by Serb and Montenegrin soldiery, with 
a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of the regions inhabited 
exclusively by Albanians.”  ^ The total number of the Albanians killed by January 1913 
was between 20,000-25,000 while tens of thousands left Kosova. “The Albanian 
experience o f Serb and Montenegrin rule created systematic hostility and hatred on a 
scale that the region had never experienced before.”  ^ A colonisation program was also 
launched but did no achieve much due to the outbreak of the First World War. At the end 
of the war Serbia brought again under its control the ethnic Albanian territories.
The attitude of the ‘new’ state of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
toward its large Albanian minority remained similar to that of the pre-war Serb Kingdom. 
The policies implemented by the government aimed at achieving two goals. Through the 
colonization program and the creation of a general atmosphere of fear the authorities 
hoped to change the ethnic ratio in Kosova by increasing the number of Serbs and forcing 
the Albanians to emigrate. Since this was regarded as the only guarantee for the 
perpetuation of their rule over Kosova and other annexed Albanian territories, the 
government very vigorously pursued the colonization program. Under various degrees 
that were issued the categories of colonists were defined and a large budget was allocated 
providing a wide range of incentives and advantages. As a result of these policies, around 
13,000 families came to Kosova, constituting more than ten percent of the population of 
Kosova. Although a number of colonists eventually returned home due to the bad living
 ^Quoted in Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 296.
® Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, London Macmillan Press, 1998, pp. 254, 258, xxix-xxx.
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conditions and fear of ‘kacak’ attacks, the number of Serbs who came to Kosova was 
much larger if we consider also those who moved to urban areas and took up different 
occupations/
The situation of the Albanians in the 1930s worsened following the imposition of 
a much more unitarist and authoritarian system of rule and as a result of new 
administrative divisions that gave wide arbitrary powers to hard-line governors. In 
addition to the stepped up campaign of police harassment, the 1930s also witnessed the 
intensification of the ‘agrarian reform. “On the basis o f a new rule all land should be 
treated as state property unless the farmer had a Yugoslav document to prove his 
ownership, something that hardly had been given to Albanians. Those disposed of the 
land were allowed to hold only 0.4 hectares of land per family. As a Serbian policy 
document noted this is below the minimum for subsistence. But that has been our policy 
to make their life impossible, and to force them to emigrate.”*
However, not all the Albanians were expected to emigrate, as the Muslim urban 
classes of Serbia were obliged to do in several nineteenth century migratory waves. 
Hence parallel to the colonization the authorities pursued assimilation policies.^ All the 
Albanian schools that were open during the Austro-Hungarian rule during the First World 
War were shut down and the official policy was that there was no Albanian minority in 
the southern provinces but only Albanian speaking Slavs. Apart from the Serb schools the 
authorities allowed the functioning of mektebes and private Turkish schools on the 
understanding that the teaching would be in Turkish. It is interesting to note that the
 ^Marenglen Verli, “The Colonising Agrarian reform in Kosova and other Albanian Regions in Yugoslavia 
After the First World War”, in Kristaq Prifti et al. (eds.), The Truth on Kosova, Tirane: Encyclopeadia, 
1993, pp. 151-56. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, pp. 280-82.
* Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, p. 283.
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authorities used pro-Serb Slav Muslims in their efforts to assimilate the Albanians. They 
were employed in the state schools and in the Islamic institutions of Kosova, but were 
rejected by the Albanians.'® However, “as the efforts to Serbianize the Albanians were 
failing the state started discouraging public education for the Albanians realizing that 
educated Albanian were more dangerous than backward ones.”"
Although the Yugoslav state had been pursuing aggressive policies against the 
Albanians, a political party known as Cemiyet (Islam Muhafaza-yi Hukuk Cemiyeti) that 
represented the interests of Albanians and Turks in Kosova and Macedonia was set up in 
1919. The Cemiyet was mainly a party representing the Muslim landowning elite and 
worked for the preservation of the large estates by cooperating with the two major parties 
in Yugoslavia; the Radicals and Democrats. However, the party did raise issues 
concerning Albanians grievances. After the elections of 1923 the Radical Party led by 
Nikolla Pasic was able to form a government only with the support of Cemiyet and the 
ethnic German party. Yet the promises made before the elections about opening of the 
Albanian schools was not kept. Similarly, the demand for the colonization program to 
stop was also ignored. As a result the Cemiyet deputies voted against the budged. The 
relations between Cemiyet and the Radicals deteriorated afterwards. The leading Cemiyet 
politician Ferat Draga wanted that the party joins the anti-Belgrade opposition but one 
wing refused to follow and the party split. At the same time a campaign of intimidation 
started. Ferat Draga was arrested together with other prominent activists. As a result, 
Cemiyet ceased to exist as a political force. *
* Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 293.
Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 299. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, p. 269.
" Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 299. 
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, p. 271.
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Apart from the Cemiyet politicians whose activities in a way legitimized the 
regime, there was also a number of Albanians who cooperated with the authorities and 
were employed in the local administration. However, it would be wrong to think that 
inter-war Yugoslavia was able to assimilate the Albanians. For the majority of them 
armed resistance known as the kacak movement was the only option.
The armed resistance started immediately after the re-imposition of Serbian rule 
in 1918, and it spread widely in the early moths of 1919 having the support of around 
10,000 fighters. The Yugoslav army was able to repress the rebellion and many kacaks 
retreated to Albania. Serb reprisals in the course of the hostilities were extremely brutal. 
Only during January and February 1919 6040 people were killed and 3,873 houses were 
destroyed. The existence of an armed rebellion gave the authorities the excuse to impose 
even harsher measures on the population at large. After a period of recovery revolts 
started again in the following year. The government could defeat the kacak force only 
after engaging large military forces, which led to the kacak withdrawal to Albania.
As noticed after every set back, the kacaks would withdraw to Albania or to the 
‘neutral zone o f Junik’ set up by the League of Nations in November 1921 when de­
limiting the border, but would bounce back again and continue the armed resistance. The 
ability o f Albanians from Kosova to operate in Albania was crucial for the existence of 
the movement. In November 1918 leading Kosovar politicians had established in the city 
of Shkoder (northeastern Albania) the Committee for the National Salvation of Kosova, 
which organized the armed resistance. As subsequent events showed, what undermined 
the movement was not so much the Yugoslav State but the policies carried out by Zog, in 
his the capacity as the interior minister. The disarmament of the northern areas of
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Albania, the suppression of the Kosova Committee, and the sending of the Albanian army 
into the Neutral zone of Junik and the setting up of joint Albanian -  Yugoslav patrols in 
January 1923, were a blow to the resistance movement in Kosova. Although the 
movement continued to operate until 1927, it had lost its vigour.*''
The kacak movement did not succeed in forcing the Yugoslav State to change its 
stance on the Albanian question. Yet it achieved a lot when we consider the extent to 
which it undermined the main factor on which the long term ability of Belgrade to control 
Kosova was based; the change in ethnic ratio. The kacak movement undermined the 
colonisation program ‘to the point where many would-be settlers were reluctant to go to 
Kosova, and many who went returned.’*^
After a decade of draconian measures the authorities were able to pacify the 
Albanians, who did not pose a threat from the middle of the 1920s onwards. Albanian 
passivity could not be permanent phenomena since the underlying factors had not 
changed. Albanians still constituted the majority of the people in the province, while 
Slavization did not make progress among them. For the time being the domestic and 
regional power configuration did not provide any opportunity for the Albanians to 
challenge the Yugoslav rule. That opportunity came with the Second World War.
Considering what the Albanians had gone through during the inter-war period, no 
wonder that they saw Axis powers as liberators. Most of the Albanian inhabited 
territories joined Albania, which was occupied by Italy. The collaboration of the 
Albanians with the Axis powers was not due to ideological sympathy with fascism. The
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, pp. 271, 273-75.
''' Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 305. Rushiti, “Tlie Outlaw Movement in Kosova”, in 
Prifti et al. (eds.), The Truth on Kosova, pp. 162-65.
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, p. 278.
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driving force was the desire to reverse the policies of the inter-war period. Due to 
Albanian attacks and fear of reprisal around 40,000 Serbs and Montenegrin left Kosova. 
At the end of the war, Albanians’ armed resistance to Tito’s government lasted longer in 
Kosova than other areas.
2.2.2. Kosova’s Status During the SFR of Yugoslavia
Albanian experience until the fall of Rankovic was in many respects similar to 
that of the pre-war period. Nevertheless, Albanian schools were open, and a compromise 
was reached on the issue of colonists whereby they could not automatically gain 
possession of the land they had had. According to the Constitution of 1946 Kosova was 
declared an ‘autonomous region’ which together with the ‘autonomous province’ of 
Vojvodina were integral parts of the Republic of Serbia. As we can notice from the 
wording, Kosova’s status was lower than that of Vojvodina’s. The latter had in addition 
an independent legislature. Supreme Court, and the structure of its government was 
similar to that of a republic, whereas Kosova’s resembled that of a local government.'^ 
The Yugoslav authorities did not try to accommodate the Albanians in the way they had 
done with Macedonians, notwithstanding their similarities. During the inter-war period 
their existence as a separate ethnic group was denied and both had waged a guerilla war 
against the state. Although the Macedonians were Slavs their loyalty to Yugoslavia could 
not be taken for granted and there were elements in the Macedonian Communist party
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, pp. 296, 305, 312.
” Paul Shoup, “The Government and Constitutional Status of Kosova”, in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti. 
(eds.). Studies on Kosova, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984, p. 233. Sami Repishti, “Tlic 
Evolution of Kosova’s Autonomy within Yugoslav Constitutional Framework”, in Studies on Kosova, pp. 
210- 11.
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that were pro-Bulgarian as shown by their defections.'* By granting republican status to 
Kosova from the start, Tito’s Yugoslavia would have shown to the Albanians that it was 
fundamentally different from the Yugoslav Kingdom, As an equal member of the 
federation the Albanians might have come to associate their future more closely with 
Yugoslavia.'^
After the 1953 constitution, the constitutional juridical powers of the provinces 
were delegated to the republic of Serbia, thus, reducing the autonomous regions to the 
status o f ordinary districts of Serbia. This trend was sanctioned by the 1963 constitution 
of Yugoslavia. The status of Kosova, though an important indicator, does not fully reveal 
the real position of the Albanians until 1966.^°
Although Kosova was declared an autonomous region Albanians were far from 
administering it. Serbs and Montenegrins constituted 50 percent of the Party membership 
and 68 percent of the administrative and leading positions, while their share of the 
population was only 27 percent. The high illiteracy rate among the Albanians, a 
consequence of Ottoman and Yugoslav policies only partially can explain the ethnic 
imbalance. After the Tito-Stalin split and Enver Hoxha’s strong critique of Tito, the 
distrust of the state toward the Albanians increased, and they were seen as politically 
unreliable. The composition of the security forces reflects this lack of trust; 58 percent 
Serb, 28 percent Montenegrin and 13 percent Albanian.^' The repressive measures 
carried out by the security forces headed by Rankovic created an atmosphere reminiscent 
of the pre-war period, which was combined with policies that encouraged Albanians to
Poulton, Who are the Macedonians! Pp. 103-4
Shoup, “The Government and Constitutional Status of Kosova”, pp. 236-37.
Repishti, “The Evolution of Kosova’s Autonomy within the Yugoslav Constitutional Framework”, pp. 
201- 2 .
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identify themselves as Turks. The Turkish minority was being strongly supported and 
promoted by the state. As a result of these policies the number of Turks went up from 97 
954 in 1948 census to 255 535 in 1953. The aim of these policies became clear with the 
signing of a Treaty between Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1953, which opened the way for 
large-scale emigration of Albanians to Turkey.
It was only after the dismissal of Rankovic in 1966 and the policy shift toward 
decentralization that the situation for the Albanians started to improve. The Albanian 
demonstration of November 1968 also helped to quicken the process of elevating the 
status o f the province. As a result of the constitutional amendments in the period 1967- 
1971, which were confirmed and further enhanced in the constitution of 1974, Kosova 
achieved de facto equality with the republics.^^ The enhancement of the status of Kosova 
was followed by a power shift to the Albanians in the province. By 1981 the proportion 
of the Albanians in the Party and security forces had risen to two-thirds.^'* Another 
important development was the establishment of the Prishtina University in 1969, 
contributing to the emergence of an Albanian intellectual class that would play an 
important role later on, in the articulation of Albanian national interests. Additionally, the 
university helped to intensify the contacts between Albanians coming from other 
inhabited regions of Yugoslavia and Kosova.
The structural changes adopted at the federal and provincial level had brought 
about an unprecedented development for both the Albanians and the Yugoslav State.
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, pp. 314-18.
Zamir Shtylla, “The Deportation of Albanians in Yugoslavia After tlic Second World War, (1950-66)”, in 
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Together with the significant level of autonomy a governing class was created that was 
Yugoslav-oriented. For the first time, since 1918 Yugoslavia had managed to integrate 
the Albanians to a certain extent. The fact that their own compatriots were governing the 
Albanians reduced the legitimacy gap between them and Belgrade.
The constitution of 1974 improved significantly the position of the Albanians, 
nevertheless, it did not solve the Kosova question once and for all. Both the Albanians 
and the Serbs were unhappy with the solution imposed by the federal authorities, of 
course, for diametrically opposed reasons. The constitution of 1974 empowered the 
Albanians but fell far short from granting it symbolic equality with other Slavic nations. 
De facto equality that Kosova had achieved could not assuage the feeling of deprivation. 
As Donald Horowitz put It “The symbolic side of the conflict is dominant and is not 
amenable to material benefits.”^^  The politically inferior status of Kosova would come to 
be viewed by the Albanians as the source of the province’s problems.
Serb grievances with the constitution run the opposite way. The enhanced status 
of the province was seen as a great injustice done to Serbia, which had lost her territorial 
integrity, and had opened the way for the Albanization of the province. In 1977 the Serb 
arguments were gathered in what came to be known as the Blue Book, which was not 
accepted by the federal authorities.^’ Paul Shoup argues that constitutional changes 
should have been coupled with a dialogue between the Serbs and the Albanians, who 
would have informed each side for the others’ legitimate interests and concerns. Yet he 
adds that this does not mean that a dialogue would have produced an agreement over the
Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History o f Kosovo, London; Hurst & Company. 1998, 
p. 174.
® Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 116.
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status of Kosova. In fact, an agreement on the final status seemed difficult to be 
achieved since the demands of both sides amounted to a zero sum situation. The 
Albanization of Kosova was an inevitable outcome if measures that reflected province’s 
ethnic composition were implemented. Serb complaints about discrimination seemed to 
have been more perceived than real. As data reveal, the overall imbalance in the public 
sector was never overcome. In 1980 one in five Serbs had a state salaried job, but only 
one in eleven Albanians had one.^^ Although individual cases of pressure and 
discrimination existed, this does not justify the Serb claim that there existed a systematic 
policy that was driving the Serbs out of the province.^” Economic reasons and differences 
in population growth rates between the Albanians and Serbs account for the widening gap 
in the ethnic ratio.^*
The source of the Serb embitterment was not Albanian discrimination but loss of 
the status they had had during the Rankovic years. As Vickers put it ‘Kosova’s Serbs had 
become dismayed and angered as their formal prestige continued to wane.’^  ^Having once 
controlled the state and party apparatuses of the province they could not accept to be 
equal or under the authority of the Albanians. As the Blue Book and the developments of 
the 1980s showed that a return to the Rankovic years is what the Serbs desired.
Albanian demonstrations in the spring of 1981 provided the Serbs with the 
opportunity they needed. Although demonstrations had come up with political demands, 
asking for Kosova to be given republican status, economic and social factors were at the
^  Shoup, “The Government and Constitutional Status of Kosova”, p. 237. 
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, p. 326.
Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 220.
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, pp. 229-33.
32 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 183.
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root. However, the authorities were not interested in addressing the real causes of the 
riots. Under Serbian pressure they were labeled as counterrevolutionary and as 
jeopardizing the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The number of those killed, though 
officially only nine, was thought to be around 300 hundred, 1200 people were given 
substantial prison terms and around 3000 people were sent to gaol for up to three months. 
In addition, a differentiation policy was pursued with the objective of purging the party 
and educational and cultural institutions from nationalist elements. The purges in the 
party were extensive. Mahmut Bakalli the chairman of the League of Communist of 
Kosova was dismissed together with other leading members. By August more than 500 
party members were expelled. Until late June 1982, the number reached 1000.^“*
The number of the security forces also increased. Until 1984 thirty new militia 
stations were built and ‘the Yugoslav army was engaged in the maximum in every 
direction in K o s o v a . T h e  Yugoslav policy was very counter-productive because it 
attacked and made hostile that layer of the Albanian society that was Yugoslav-oriented. 
Although Albanian officials were still running the province, the situation was no longer 
the same. The fact that Albanian officials were acting under orders from the Serbian 
republican leaders, added to the general anger. As a prominent Albanian politician Fadil 
Hoxha described the situation “ ...the youth not only do they not listen to us, but they are 
even calling us traitors, that we are allegedly think only about our personal interests, 
salaries and so forth.” ®^ With the 1981 events the slow homogenization of the Albanians
”  Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 201, Malcdolm, Kosovo: A Short History, pp. 336-7.
Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-91, pp. 196-97. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short 
History, pp. 335-36.
Kristaq Prifti, “Who Uses Violence in Kosova and Against Wltom is it Directed?”, in Prifli et al. (cds.). 
The Truth on Kosova, p. 278.
Quoted in Jens Reuters, “Educational Policy in Kosova”, in Pipa and Repishti (cds.). Studies on Kosova. 
p. 264.
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started once again; however, this would become salient only following the abolition of 
the autonomy in 1989.
In reaction to the 1981 events Serb nationalism was let loose. The plight of the 
Kosova Serbs became the main theme of many historical books, and media articles in the 
early 1980s. At the same time, as the media campaign was under way, the Kosova Serb 
community started to organize. Petitions were presented to the federal assembly in 
Belgrade and demonstrations organized. “At the core of this reaction was a group of 
Serbian nationalists intellectuals with high level positions or contacts in the party, army 
and the church”. In January 1986 216 prominent intellectuals presented a petition to the 
Yugoslav assembly complaining about the suffering of the Serbs. A year earlier the Serb 
Academy o f Science had produced the ‘notorious Memorandum’.
Although Milosevic used nationalist feelings to come to power, at the end of 
1987, he was not the originator of the reaction.^* Later on during the Yugoslav wars of 
secession and in the Kosova crisis Serb nationalism would be identified with Millosevic. 
However, such a view fails to see that the driving force behind it was a much larger group 
of people. Once Milosevic strengthened its power base in Serbia, he moved against the 
Party leadership in Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosova, under the guise of the so-called 
‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’. In late 1988, Azem Vlasi and Kaqusha Jashari were 
replaced with Milosevic appointees, and in March 1989 under the state of emergency that 
was declared early that year the provincial assembly in Kosova passed constitutional 
amendments that made possible the abrogation of the Kosova autonomy. In response.
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, pp. 338-41.
Nicholas Miller, “A failed transition: The case of Serbia”, in Davvisha and Parrot (eds.). Politics, Power, 
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major demonstrations were held throughout Kosova. The Albanian demonstrations of 
1989-90 were the last pro-Yugoslav and pro-Tito rallies held in Yugoslavia, in support of 
the 1974 constitution.^^
2.2.3. Kosova after the Disintegration of Yugoslavia
However just the abolition of the autonomy could not satisfy the Serbian goal of 
bringing Kosova firmly under control. As we have seen throughout this short historical 
survey, Serbian control of the province has always embodied two elements: the need to 
change the ethnic ratio and to force the Albanians to accept a subordinate position. The 
same program started to be implemented from the 1990s onwards. A number of laws and 
measures opened the way for the expulsion of 115 000 Albanians from the work place, 
the closing down of the Prishtina University, annulling retrospectively sales of property 
to Albanians from Serbs, and strengthening the position of Serbs in the province. In the 
summer of 1991 the colonization program was openly pursued by passing a law that 
entitled Serbs and Montenegrins who wanted to settle in Kosova to 5 hectares of land.
Serb policies created a totally new pattern of relationship between the Albanians 
and the state. They underwent a process of ethnic homogenization. The regime could not 
rely any longer on the Albanian leadership to rule the province, as was the case in the 
1980s. Serbian measures had discredited the communist party and brought its 
disintegration. The intellectual circles associated with the University o f the Pristina
Slikelzen Maliqi, Shqiptaret dhe Evropa, Peje: Dukagjini, 1994, p. 41. 
Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, pp. 346-47.
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formed the leadership of the new political movement of Albanian in Kosova. For the first 
time the Albanians had a unified leadership with a clear political program.'*'
Albanian movement represented by the LDK in early 1990 called for full 
autonomy. It was as a result of Serb intransigence and the break of war in the summer of 
1991. That Albanian demands escalated and set the achievement of independence as the 
only legitimate goal.“*^ In the face of Serb occupation Albanians adopted peaceful 
resistance and channeled their energies and resources toward the establishment of the 
parallel state. Through the solidarity fund the education and health system were 
maintained.'*^ The pacifist way chosen by the Albanians seems to have been both 
constrained by the circumstances since they were unarmed and could not expect help 
from Albania but also an achievement. It has been a great success to maintain the 
nonviolent movement if we consider the war-like traditions, the cult of arms and the long 
history of the armed uprisings by the Albanians. The pacifist way deprived the Serbs 
from the excuse they needed to start a war in early 1990s.'*'*
Despite the achievements and the fact that it won international praise the peaceful 
way could not force the Serbs to change their stance on Kosovo. “For a nonviolent 
campaign to be successful it is critical to create a dependency relationship in the form of 
a third party between Albanians and Belgrade. In this case the international community 
would have exercised pressure on Belgrade to force them to make concessions^^
Elez Biberaj, “Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg”, in Peter Jankc (cd.). Ethnic and Religious Conflict, 
Dortmouth, England, 1994, pp. 8-9.
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However, the international community failed to fulfill this role. It supported the peaceful 
resistance but not the goal of independence and saw the Kosovo question mainly as a 
human rights issue. Until the escalation of the conflict in March 1998, the mediation 
efforts of the international community were incoherent and primarily declaratory."**
The Dayton Peace Accords marked a major setback for the Albanians. Kosova 
was not included in the peace negotiations, and European countries unconditionally 
recognized rump Yugoslavia. What was left in place was the outer wall of sanctions that 
prevented Yugoslav membership in international organisations unless Yugoslavia made 
life a little better for Albanians in Kosova."*  ^ As a consequence of these developments 
criticism o f Rugova’s leadership and the nonviolent movement increased. Rugova had 
not proved to be an efficient leader, which was shown by the fact that since 1992 there 
had been no organized resistance to Serb rule resulting in the demoralization in the 
people. Many prominent figures like Rexhep Qosja, Adem Demaci and Bujar Bukoshi, 
asked for a reassesment of the strategy used so far and advocated more active opposition. 
Besides the reassessment of the means, Adem Demace challenged the ultimate goal by 
putting forth his idea that a final settlement should be a kind of confederation. But the 
greatest challenge to Rugova’a leadership came from an organization called Kosova 
Liberation Army (KLA). Not much was known about the KLA then. But its attacks on 
security forces increased in the course of 1997."**
Though until 1998 no real pressure had been exercised on Belgrade either by the 
international community or Kosovar Albanians, this does not mean that the Serb
Stephan Troebst Conflict in Kosovo: Failure o f  Prevention?, Flcnsburg: European Center for Minority 
Issues, 1998, at http://www.ecmi.de/publications.
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authorities had no reason to start a dialogue with the Albanians in order to find an 
accommodation. In fact, in retrospective, we could say that Serbia lost a golden 
opportunity by not restoring autonomy to Albanians. The political atmosphere in Serbia, 
however, was and still is not conducive to reaching a settlement. There was no difference 
between the opposition and Milosevic who had built his political career on Kosova and 
had ruled our any possibility that autonomy could be restored. This intransigent attitude 
of the political class perfectly reflected the Serb public opinion on the issue: 41.8% of 
Serbs believed that the solution is to be seen in the forcible expulsion of Albanians while 
27.2% which manifested some democratic tolerance would be willing at best to grant 
cultural autonomy.''^
The repressive policies that the Serbs had carried out relentlessly since 1989 
shows that besides the fact that they had no other strategy, they believed that the 
crackdown would force the Albanians to accept a subordinate position. The Serb policy 
resulted only in a change of means from non-violent to armed resistance, but not a change 
in objectives.
The Serbs have been unable to alter the ethnic ratio in the province. The 
colonization program initiated in 1991 did not attract the Serbs and Montenegrins to go to 
Kosova. Moreover, the authorities were unable to persuade the Serb refugees of the Croat 
and Bosnian wars to stay in Kosova, many of them moved to Serbia proper and
Fabian Schmidt, “Teaching the Wrong Lesson in Kosovo”, Transition, Vol. 2, No. 14, 12 July, 1996, p. 
37. Veton Surroi, The Albanian National Question: Tlie Post Dayton Pay-off’, War Report, No. 41, May 
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Quoted in Troebst, ConJIict in Kosova: Failure o f Prevention. Available also at
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Vojvodina, and by the summer of 1996 the number of the refugees in Kosova was only 
19 000.^’
Meanwhile, for political and economic reason close to 400000 Albanians have left 
Kosova for Western Europe. Although at first glance it looks as if the Serbs have 
achieved some of their goals the truth is different. The Albanians emigration has not had 
any significant effect on the ethnic structure of Kosova, and has not weakened the 
Albanian element. To the contrary, the Albanian emigrants with their remittances 
constituted one of the strongest pillars of the resistance, helping the Albanian society to 
stand Serb economic pressure. Other factors have contributed as well; like the strong 
family structure and the fact that the majority of the people were not integrated in the 
system, but were employed mainly in the agriculture and private sector, which worked as 
a shield.
In terms of changing the ethnic ratio the future seems to be even gloomier for the 
Serbs. If the population ratio of Albanian to Serbs is roughly 9 to 1, the growth rate is 16 
to 1,^  ^ the reality in Kosova has led many scholars and analysts to the conclusion that 
Serbia has lost Kosova. As the historian Noel Malcolm puts it “No matter how powerless 
the Kosova leadership might be in the short and medium term, the most important and the 
long-term weakness of all lie on the Serbian side.” It is this reality that made Alexander 
Despic propose in mid-1996 for a civilized secession of the region from the federation. '^*
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Since the Serbian annexation of Kosova in 1912, the Serbs have never opened a 
dialogue with the Albanians in order to find an accommodation. In this respect Milosevic 
does not appear to be an exception, but the rule. The only difference with the past, it is 
that under his rule the Serbian position was becoming more and more untenable for the 
Albanians.
2.3. The Escalation of Conflict in Kosova and International Community's Attitude 
The disillusionment with the pacifist way and the international community 
combined with Serb repression and intransigence led to an increase of KLA activity by 
the end of 1997. The scale of armed clashes between the KLA and the Serb security 
forces in March led to an urgent meeting of the Contact Group on 9 March established 
during the Bosnian war. Despite the fact that the conflict continued, no military action 
was taken to stop it. Fearing NATO’s airstrikes, Serb military had reduced their scale of 
operations, thus making possible for the KLA to control substantial territories. Due to this 
development the West decided not to intervene because that would have helped the 
Albanians win independence. This indicated that the West was more interested in 
preventing the statehood for Kosova than solving the conflict. At this point the political 
aims of both the international community and Milosevic converged.^’ In fact after a 
statement by a political representative of KLA, that the ultimate goal was the unification 
of all Albanian inhabited territories the West tolerated renewed Serb offensive in July. 
The offensive created hundreds of thousands of refugees. Thousands crossed into
Borden, “Kosovo Contradictions”, Balkan Crisis Report, No. 41.
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Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia but the majority remained displaced within Kosova. 
In order to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe NATO threatened with air strikes.^*
The Milosovic-Hoolbroke Agreement that followed, like the previous western 
policy on the region did not focus on the question of the political status of the region and 
in this way legitimized Milosevis political aims. The Agreement was deeply flawed 
because it allowed for the 20000 troops to remain in Kosova that were responsible for the 
atrocities and what is more important, was dependent for its success on the political will 
of Milosevic.
At the beginning of this chapter we asked the question: Is autonomy a sustainable 
solution that would bring stability to the regio? The answer to this question is no. Not 
only because it did not work in the past and none of the parties were satisfied with it, but 
“primarily because the majority of the Albanians have by now opted resoundingly for full 
independence by violent means.” While the ultimate outcome of an armed conflict cannot 
be known, a protracted warfare would be the probable scenario, which would pose a 
danger to the region.^*
Many analysts have criticized the west’s policy, on the grounds that by ruling out 
independence to Kosova as an accepted solution, it was legitimizing Milosevic’s goals, 
thus leading to a protracted war. They argue that dangers to regional stability do not come 
from the indepedence of Kosova but for a policy that prolongs the life o f Milosovic’s 
doomed federation. As along as Kosova remained part of Serbia/Yugoslavia, Milosevic,
^  Robert Hayden, “The State as a Legal Fiction” East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 
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by manipulating the Albanian question could spread the conflict in Macedonia and 
Montenegro to attract attention from the Kosovar crisis, and present the Albanians as a 
destabilizing factor. Additionally, with Kosova question unresolved the chance for 
democratization in Serbia was blocked, which means the continuation of the mafiosi 
State that Milosevic has created. The real question that policy makers should confront “is 
not whether Kosova should become independent, but in what context self-determination 
can be reasonably exercised.”^^
The Rambouilet process, actually, did reflect some of the arguments mentioned 
above and by so doing it marked a watershed in the West's policy toward Milosevic’s 
Serbia, which was identified as the main source of regional instability. The proposal 
required the withdrawal of the troops, which would be the corner stone for the 
implementation of the accord. In other words, the implementation of the Agreement 
would have confined Milosevic to Serbs borders, so that any crisis that he could generate 
would not be any longer a threat to the region. In this way. Western-policy makers 
thought that they could solve the Kosova question without dealing directly with the root 
causes o f the conflict. The Hill proposals on which Rombouilet formula was based 
provided for Kosova substantial autonomy, but not independence. Although presented as 
an interim solution, the agreement lacked a mechanism for settling the Kosova status in 
three years.®® However, a legal analyst saw the agreement from a different light. Hayden 
argued that "the American policy for Kosova would foster the illusion of Kosovo's 
continuation within Yugoslavia, while ensuring that the republican and federal authorities
Melanie MacDonagh, “Why is a Free Kosovo ruled out?”, New Statesman, 7 August, 1998, p. 22, Janusz 
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be unable to exercise any authority in Kosova. Like in the case of Bosnia» llie 
constitutional structures do not create workable state. The creation of fictive states is 
counterproductive at least in so far as the goals really do include security, stability and 
democracy for the people leaving there.”'  ^ While the Albanians reluctantly signed the 
agreement, since it did not provide for a referendum on independence the Serbian side 
rejected it. Meanwhile, the Serbs were preparing a major clampdown as the building of 
forces around Kosova continued and the fighting escalated. Confronted with such a 
situation NATO decided to launch airstraikes.
During the 78 days long NATO campaign two things became clear. The longer 
the conflict would last the greater were the dangers that would spill over to neighboring 
countries. It also became clear that Milosevic and his clique, not the Albanians whether in 
Kosova, Macedonia or Albania, as it was feared, were behind such a scenario. Through 
the refugees crisis mainly but also by using other means Milosevic hoped that he could 
destabilize Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia. The latter in particular was targeted as 
being the most vulnerable. As stated by the Macedonian deputy Prime Minister and 
Interior Minister at a press conference: "Macedonia is under pressure from powerful 
subversive activities instigated from abroad with the aim of involving the country in so- 
called Kosova s c e n a r i o . T h e  leaders of the Democratic Party of Albanians Arbcn 
Xhaferri and Menduh Thaci, also pointed to the same pressure that has been brought to 
bear on Macedonia. Xhaferi said that through the refugee crisis Milosevic expected to 
radicalize the two communities and bring them to the situation where they would have
Daalder, “What Holbrooke Wrouglit”, The Weekly Standart.
Hayden, “State as a Legal Fiction”, East European Constitutional Eeview.
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adopted diametrically opposite views on NATO strikes and the issue of refugees in 
Macedonia thus precipitating a governmental crisis and even interethnic conflict.^^ 
However, Milosevic could not succeed in destabilising the country as Deputy Prime 
Minister said: "All the institution of the system are working perfectly which is also due to 
the high level of the inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia.”^^  This last point disproves the 
belief held by the international community that the Albanians of Macedonia would seize 
the opportunity to rebel against Skopje. During the euphoric spring of 1998 when it was 
said that KLA controlled 30-40 percent of Kosova’s territory no tension was recorded in 
Macedonia. That was the case during the refugee crisis too, despite the not very decent 
behavior o f Macedonian authorities toward the refugees.
Milosevic also used the conflict with NATO to step up pressure on Montenegro’s 
leadership. The dangerousness of the new development was indicated by the fact that the 
army was now being used to exercise pressure, as Djukanovic declared that Montenegro 
would remain neutral and does not recognize the state of war. Many observers’ thought 
that the aim of the army was to stage a military coup, which was prevented from 
materializing by 15,000 well-armed police forces, controlled by Djukanovic.*^^
Despite all this and the horrendous crimes that the Serb forces perpetrated on 
Albanian population, the West still speaks about the territorial integrity of FRY, and just 
self-governance for the Albanians. Contrary to the views of many analysts and to the 
body o f evidence produced by the Serb-NATO war, the western policy-makers are stuck 
to the view that independence for Kosova could set a dangerous precedent. It is not only
ALBPRESS, 21 April, 1999, Skopje. Interview with Mcnduh Tliaci, in Deinokratsiya, 5 April. 1999. 
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Kosova but Montenegro, too, that seems to be moving the same path. Montenegrin 
leadership has stated that unless Serbia is willing to reform the present relationship in the 
federation toward a confederate type of arrangement, Montenegro would opt for 
independence. However, the West does no support such moves. As a journalist from 
Podgorica noted; "In its drive for independence Montenegro is in the straightjacket of 
Kosova. In dealing with Kosova the international community is determined to keep alive 
a third Yugoslavia that is unviable and effectively, already dead.” *^* It seems that 
international community would be investing capital and energies toward a goal that is not 
sustainable. As Janusz Bugajski argues that 'it will be largely up to the Kosovars to prove 
that they can effectively and legitimately govern themselves.
However, there are good grounds to argue that the goal of an independent Kosova 
should not be obstructed, as seems to be the case with the international community and 
Kosova, but it should be assisted. First of all, with regard to the conflict in Kosova, 
international community should work toward a solution that, once achieved, does not 
provide opportunities for any of the parties to change it.^ * An arrangement that keeps 
Kosova in Serbia /Yugoslavia can not be considered as a permanent and final solution. 
Such structural arrangement, like the one provided for in the constitution of 1974, would 
be vulnerable to attacks by both sides, as they remain unsatisfied with it. The western 
policy is based on the premises that the democratization of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and 
self-governance for the Albanians would remove the sources of discontent. However, this
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line of reasoning is deeply flawed. First, removal of Milosevic and his clique docs not 
mean that the Serb society has change its attitude toward Kosova and the Albanian 
question as we showed, there was no difference between Miloshevic and the opposition 
on the Kosova issue, a stance that reflected the general public mode in Serbia.*’ As far as 
security o f Kosova is concerned in the short and medium term, with a weakened Serbia 
that depends on western capital for reconstruction and the presence of NATO troops in 
Kosova, it does not matter much who rules in Belgrade. In the long run, the sole 
guarantee against resurgent nationalism would be reexamination by Serbs of their 
national myths and history. Yet, stability should not depend on the willingness of the 
parties not to take certain actions but on the security structures that constrains such 
actions. On the other hand, the Albanians cannot be expected to accept a solution that 
keeps them in Serbia. Even before the recent ethnic cleansing and atrocities committed by 
Serbs the difference between the two sides were unbridgeable. Moreover, the Albanians 
have never been so close to independence as they are now. Independence is the long-term 
solution to create security structures that can be sustained.
2.4. An Independent Kosova does not Pose a Threat to Regional Security
At the international level the independence of Kosova docs not set a dangerous 
precedent. As an international legal analyst argues: “Kosova has been an extraordinary 
episode in the modern history, but not because some new destabilizing principle was
Jim Hogland, “Serbs Must Shoulder Blame for their Leader’s Actions”. The U'ashingion Post. I June 
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established. Rather, Kosova is the rare case where the strict conditions set by 
international law of secession were met.”’°
At the regional level, too, the strengthening of the Albanian factor as a result of 
Kosova s independence does not pose a threat to Macedonians security, since it does not 
change the basic geostrategic relationship, which resulted in the creation of Macedonia.^' 
Other states in the region much stronger do not pose a threat to Macedonia as we showed 
in the previous chapter, but have come to see the existence of Macedonia as a balancing 
factor. So much less would Kosova pose a threat to it. Albanian leaders whether in 
Tirana, Pristine or Skopje, have consistently declared that they support a stable and 
independent Macedonia. The Albanians have insisted that an independent state separating 
unfriendly Serbia and Greece is in the Albanian vital national interests. Kosova’s 
independence does not change this reality. In addition, for the foreseeable future, no 
matter how quick and solid Kosova’s and Albanian economic recovery are, both of them, 
but Kosova more so, would depend on the international guarantee for their security. It is 
difficult to imagine then how they could become a threat to a third party.
Between Kosova and Macedonia exists a strong security link. During the Kosova 
crisis the security of Macedonia was in jeopardy. While the preferable solution for both 
the Macedonians and the international community would have been an autonomous status 
within FRY. There was also one solution that they strongly opposed, even more than 
independence; the partition of Kosova. It was the partition of Kosova that could have set 
a dangerous precedent for Macedonia. Kosova had to remain whole, whether as an 
autonomous unit or as an independent state. At the same time Kosova is tied by the same
™ Jonathan Tepperman, “Freedom for Kosovo is not a Dangerous Precedent”, International Herald 
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security link. Albanians are well aware that if a war breaks out in Macedonia not only the 
borders of Macedonia but also those of Kosova, at least, would be subject to change. The 
independence of Kosova has turned Albanians into a status-quo force.
As Janusz Bugasjski argues "the independence of Kosova rather than provoking 
calls for a greater Albania would actually resolve the Albanian question and pacify their 
demands.”’  ^ There is also an important precedent indicating the limit of Albanians 
aspirations. In 1920 Protogerov for IMRO and Hasan Bey Prishtina for the Albanians 
signed an agreement for the liberation of Macedonia in her ethnographic and geographic 
frontiers with only Debar which is on the border, to be decided by a future plebiscite.’  ^
As we see the Albanians of Macedonia cannot expect help from their brethren across the 
border. This is why the ethnic relations in Macedonia are confined within that states 
borders.
” Quoted in Shea, Macedonia and Greece, p. 320.
Bugajski, “Independent Kosovo”, Christian Science Monitor, 
”  Quoted in Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, p. 92.
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CHAPTERS
ALBANIA’S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND 
MACEDONIA
3.1. The Establishment of a Truncated Albania and the National Question
On 28 November 1912 the Albanians declared their independence. A month later 
the Conference of the Ambassadors in London accepted the creation of an Albanian 
entity, with the final border settlement agreed upon a year later in December 1913. The 
newly established Albanian state did not correspond to the vision of the Albanian 
national movement, which struggled for a state that would incorporate all Albanian 
inhabited territories. However, it was not merely a question of injustice done to the 
Albanians, the very existence and viability of the new state was in question. Albanian 
leaders had always advanced economic and geopolitical arguments in addition to the 
ethnic factor to support their goal. Cut off from its best territories allocated to Greece, 
Serbia and Montenegro, the prospect of Albania to achieve economic development, with 
all the implications of this on the social and political dimensions, were bleak.'
Until the declaration of independence, the Albanians had been fighting for a 
single cause, the creation of state that would incorporate all Albanian territories. With the 
establishment of a truncated Albania a process of differentiation started taking place 
between the interests of the Albanians living in the new state and those of the Albanians 
across the border who were experiencing a totally different reality.
'HysamedinFerraj, Skice eMendimit PolitikShqiptar, Koha, Tiranc, 1998, pp.151-52. J.S\virc,/l№iJ/j/fl the 
Rise o f  a Kingdom, ARNO Press & the New York Times, 1971, pp. 150-53.
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At the end of the First World War leading Albanian politicians from Kosova 
established in Shkoder the Kosovo Committee, to organise and assist the armed 
resistance against Serbian rule. At the same time these prominent figures participated in 
the political life of Albania and held positions even as cabinet members. They advocated 
the continuation of the armed struggle for the recovery of the lost territory. The weak 
Albanian state, however, was unable to provide assistance.^ Although recognised as an 
independent state in 1912, Albania’s existence was once again questioned as indicated by 
the agreement reached between Lloyd George, Nitti and Clemenceau to partition Albania 
by giving the north to Yugoslavia, the south to Greece and the rest to mandate. The firm 
opposition of president Wilson against any partition plan improved significantly the 
position of Albania, but did not fully settle the problem as Yugoslavia continued to 
intervene in Albania and in October 1921 advanced deeply into its territory. As a result of 
such developments the Conference of Ambassadors decided on the border issue with 
slight changes to the 1913 border.^
As the Albanians were struggling to maintain their truncated state, the focus of 
attention shifted away from the national question. The majority of Albanian politicians 
believed that Albania could not afford to wage a war against Yugoslavia. Rather, the 
energies and resources should be channelled toward the strengthening of the state. Thus 
no irredentist vision was implanted into the state ‘ideology’.'* Against such a background 
the Albanian politicians that advocated the continuation of the armed resistance appeared 
as the ‘odd man out’. They were seen as a source of instability, a factor obstructing the 
strengthening of the state, and improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. The Albanian
"Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 150-53. 
 ^J.Swire, Albania: The Rise o f  a Kingdom, pp.307-8,363-70.
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state was not willing to condition its relations with Yugoslavia, on the Albanians living 
there.
In the beginning of 1922, Zogu, as Minister of Interior, embarked upon a policy 
o f disarming the population. While under normal conditions, that would have been a 
legitimate and necessary measure aiming at restoring order, for the northern Albanians 
that faced the Yugoslav threat and supported the kacak movement in Kosova it was 
totally unacceptable. As a result, Bajram Curri, Elez Jusufi, and Hamid Toptani started an 
insurrection against Zogu. But they failed to overthrow him. After this Zogu's position 
strengthened and became Prime Minister. Such a development could not be welcomed by 
the leaders of the Kosova Committee, since Zogu was opposed to irredentism. In January 
1923 another insurrection against Zogu was staged supported by the Albanian bands that 
used the neutral zone of lunik as a safe haven, but again did not succeed. At this point the 
Albanian irredentists from Kosova constituted the greatest danger to Zogu.
As we showed in the previous chapter, in cooperation with Yugoslav troops he 
attacked the neutral zone of Junik and eliminated it.  ^ After this blow the resistance 
movement in Kosova was seriously weakened. The personal enmity that had developed 
between Zogu and the leaders of the Kosova Committee notwithstanding, the source of 
conflict laid at the different interests. Despite his personal quest for power, Zogu 
represented the interests of the Albanian state which were perceived as being different 
from those of the Albanians beyond the border, whereas Albanian nationalists saw the 
interest of both groups as being the same, arguing that a viable Albanian state would be 
established only by achieving national unity. Even after, Zogu was overthrown by a
Mere Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, Kolia, Tiranc, p. 40. 
 ^Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 305.
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combination of forces, between Democrats and the leaders of Kosova Committee that 
brought Fan Noli in power. The policy of the Albanian government toward the 
neighbours and the national question did not change.^ Sixth months later, Zogu regained 
power, with the help of the Yugoslav army and took measures to destroy the Kosova 
Committee. Yet in many other aspects of his rule, Zogu appeared as a nationalist.
It is worth mentioning the fact that he allowed and encouraged nationalist imbued 
literature, instilled nationalism in the education system, which placed Kosova in the 
national memory.’ We can conclude that structural constrains, in terms of power 
distribution in the region were the main factors shaping Albanian policy. A weak Albania 
overwhelmed by the task of state building and striving to maintain its security could not 
focus on the national question. With the outbreak of the Second World war, the national 
question appeared once again as an issue in Albanian politics. In August 1943, Albanian 
Communist party and National Front (which supported a democratic form of government 
and national unification) agreed to fight together and “called for a plebiscite to decide 
whether the Kosovars wanted to remain under Yugoslav rule or unite with their mother 
country.”
The agreement reached at Mukja was detrimental to the interests of the Yugoslav 
communist party and Yugoslav territorial integrity. Since the Albanian communist party 
was created with the assistance, and maintained close links, with the Yugoslav 
communist party the latter was able to exercise enough pressure to force the Albanian 
communist party to denounce the agreement. *
* Swire, Albania the Rise o f a Kingdom, p. 434.
’ Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosova, p.29. Fcrraj, Skice e Mendimil Politik Shqiptar, pp. 196-70,
67
3.2. Albania s Attitude Toward the National Question During the Communist 
Period.
After the war, the question of Kosova was overshadowed by the project of 
creating a Balkan communist federation. During this period, Albania was under strong 
influence of Yugoslavia, and had it not been for the Stalin-Tito split in 1948, the merger 
between the two countries would have happened. The split gave Albania the opportunity 
to break off the relations with Yugoslavia and become one of the strongest critics of Tito. 
While assisting Albania to maintain its independence, these developments had a negative 
impact on the Albanians of Yugoslavia. The already existing repressive policies were 
intensified. The death of Stalin brought to an end to the secure position that Albania 
enjoyed. Krushchevs’s policies of rapprochement with Yugoslavia and de-stalinization 
threatened directly Enver Hoxha, and his associates, as others in the Party asked for 
reassessment of party policy. At the same time, Albanians’ position vis-a vis Yugoslavia 
was weakened significantly. An alliance with China appeared to be the best answer to the 
worries of Albanian leadership. Through it, the latter expected to stave off political and 
economic pressure that was exercised by the Soviet block strengthened its position and 
continue with the Stalinist policies. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
brought a rapprochement between Albania and Yugoslavia, with Albania offering to 
come to Yugoslavia’s assistance in the case of a Soviet attack.
This move towards improving relations reflected Albania’s security concerns and 
was not influenced in any way by the question of Albanians in Yugoslavia. The interests 
of the ‘mother country’ toward the conditions of Albanians in Yugoslavia is best 
illustrated by the extent to which it covered events in the media. Between October 1968
® Albania a Socialist Maverick, Boullldcr, Westview, 1990, pp.18-19.
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and March 1969 (this period includes the massive demonstrations held by the Albanians 
after the fall of Rankovic demanding among others republican status) only two articles 
were written on Kosova, in the Party’s daily ‘Zeri i Popullit.’ (While there were 13 
articles only about the deplorable situation of the working class in Yugoslavia and the 
connection between Titism and Western imperialism, 16 articles on the revolutionaries of 
Laos, 44 articles on Palestian resistance, 108 on Vietnam resistance and 168 on Chines 
progress.)^
Despite the motivation behind this rapprochement Kosova did benefit from it. 
After the fall of Rankovic Yugoslavia underwent constitutional changes that were 
finalised with the constitution of 1974 granting Kosova what amounted to de facto 
republican status. Reflecting this relaxed atmosphere, and Yugoslav interest in 
strengthening relations with Albania, Kosova was assigned the bridge-building role 
between the two countries. The contacts between Prishtina and Tirana in educational and 
cultural fields assisted Albanians of Kosova in building their own institutions in these 
areas. The fact that Albanians of Kosova adopted the standard literary language, that was 
in use in Albania greatly facilitated the cultural exchange and prevented the development 
of cultural differentiation The contacts between the two countries could have been even 
more intense, but the Albanian leadership was unwilling to establish close links fearing 
ideological ‘contamination’ from the Yugoslav branch of socialism. Actually several 
central committee members and ministers were dismissed in the 1970s, on the grounds
that wanted to introduce revisionist reforms. 10
® Ferraj, Skice e Mendimit Politik Shqiptar, p. 322. 
Biberaj, Albania a Socialist Maverick, pp. 34-35.
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Following the Albanian demonstration in Kosova in 1981 and Albania’s support 
for Kosova being granted republican status, relations between the two countries were 
severed once again. However, Albanian authorities clearly stated that they supported the 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and that they would not like to see the situation 
deteriorate since it was not in their interests." Moreover, the fact that the nationalism of 
Albanians in Kosova was not controlled by the Albanian authorities in Tirana had created 
concerns. With Alia’s rise to power, Albania tried to improve relations with Yugoslavia 
and played down the Kosova issue. The overriding objectives guiding Albania’s foreign 
relations aimed at maintaining the country’s independence and Party’s leadership grip on 
power without having to relinquish the Stalinist policies. The Kosova question was, thus, 
subordinated to other concerns. Considering the huge difference between Yugoslavia and 
Albania in terms of power indicators and the rigidity of the Cold war international 
system, there was no way that Albania could have succeeded in influencing the attitude 
of the Yugoslav state toward the national question.
Apart from looking at the attitude of Albania toward the national question in its 
foreign relations there is another important aspect, that is, the domestic policies of the 
state regarding the national question. Albanians on either side of the border were 
experiencing different socio-economic and political realities and developing under 
conditions of total isolation from each other. Hence it was of paramount importance that 
the Albanian authorities should have pursued policies in the education and cultural fields 
to keep alive in peoples’ national consciousness the fact that they were part of a large
” BibsTH}, Albania a Socialist Maverick, p. 95 
Miranda Vickers, Behveen Serbs and Albanians, p. 205.
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national unit that extended beyond their state’s borders. It is in this level, the domestic 
one, that communist rule caused the greatest harm to the national question.
The history and cultural achievements of the Albanians were constructed and 
presented in a way that contracted and narrowed the concept of fatherland and Albanian 
nationality. So even though the title of books such as ‘History of Albania’ and ‘History of 
Albanian literature’, or phrases such as “the struggle for national liberation” and “typical 
Albanian national dresses” sounded all encompassing, in their scope; they covered only 
the Albanians living in the Albanian state. The struggle o f the Albanians for national 
liberation against Serb rule, or their literary achievements were not presented in these 
books. The process of political socialisation in the Albanian education system had in a 
way equalised the concept of nationality with that of citizenship.'^ Apart from 
‘shrinking’ of the concept of nation, the communist rule also weakened the nationalist 
and the patriotic feelings among the population, though not intentionally. Albanian 
nationalism was no longer based on the culture, traditions and historically accumulated 
experience of the nation but on the socialist ideology. As an Albanian analyst put it 
“nationalist sentiments were cultivated more like a vague ideological and romantic 
feeling toward the glorious and the only communist country in the world’ rather than 
toward the nation and people itself’.'“* As the only genuine socialist country in the world 
Albania was surrounded by capitalist and revisionist countries, bent on destroying it. 
Albanians had to be always on alert to safeguard their country's independence and 
socialist principles. The authorities extensively employed nationalistic and patriotic 
slogans to justify their policies on the economic hardships that the country was going
Fenaj, Skice e Mendimit PolitikShqiptar, pp. 327-31
Agim Isaku, “Opening the Albanian Dossief’, War Repot, No. 41, May 1996, p. 27.
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through. In the end, the result of such policies and practices alienated the population from 
anything that involved nationalist and patriotic rhetoric. This was the general mood that 
characterised Albanians as they entered post cold war era.
3.3. The Foreign Policy of the Democratic-Ied Government toward Kosova
In stark contrast with the up to then attitude of the Albanian state toward the 
national question in the post-communist Albania, the national question became a foreign 
policy priority. What factors accounted for this dramatic change in Albanian stance? Due 
to the collapse of communism and democratic transformation that was occurring through 
the former communist block, Albania found itself better placed to support the cause of 
the ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia. Prominent figures in Kosova and Albania criticised 
the slow pace of reforms in Albania, arguing that démocratisation of Albania would be of 
great assistance to Kosova.
Despite their personal desire to raise the question of human and national rights of 
the Albanians in Yugoslavia, many Albanian diplomats during the communist period 
were handicapped by the Stalinist nature of the Albanian regime that ruthlessly 
suppressed its own people.*^ While démocratisation increased the disposition of Albania 
to focus more on the plight of Albanians across the border, several other developments 
forced the newly elected democratic government to formulate a clear stance toward the 
national question and pursue an active foreign policy.
The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of Yugoslav wars had a two­
fold effect on Tirana. On the one hand, the isolation of Serbia, and its relegation to a
15 Elez Biberaj, “Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg”, pp. 10-11. 
Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lujia ne Kosova, p. 29.
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pariah status that provided a greater diplomatic space for Albania to assist Albanians in 
Kosova, on the other, it presented an ominous threat from Serbia. If the war spread to 
Kosova, then Albania would have, ultimately, been dragged into it as well. Such a 
development would have been chatastrophic for Albania whose “armed forces were 
grossly inadequate for the country’s defence”,*^  and in addition, was going through one 
of the most difficult periods in its history. A general situation of turmoil prevailed as the 
comniunist system was collapsing and the country was moving toward pluralism. The 
internal security had been broken and the country was experiencing a severe economic 
and social dislocation that had reduced Albania to total dependence on foreign 
assistance. The avoidance of war became the overriding foreign policy objective. 
Against this background the claim and fears of many analysts and policy-makers that 
Tirana was pursuing a policy aimed at the creation of a ‘Greater Albania’ appear utterly 
unfounded and even ridiculous. The cautious policy adopted by Tirana cannot be 
primarily attributed to western and US pressure but to domestic and regional constraints 
that drastically limited its options.’® Actually, what provided the US and the Albanian 
governments with the opportunity to develop a strategy that would prevent the spread of 
the war southward was the decision of the Albanians in Kosova to organise a non-violent 
movement. Thus the US pressure did not reverse Tirana and Prishtina’s policy, but only 
solidified the already established stance.
What we notice from these developments is the convergence of interests between 
the Albanian state and the Albanians in Kosova. In the past, as we showed, Albania had
Biberaj,.i4№a/j/o in Transition, Weslvicw Press, 1998, p. 251
Louis Zanga, “Albania Reduced total Dependence on Foreign Food”, RFIs/RI. Research Reports, Vol. 1.
No. 8,21 Febraary 1992.
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tried to enhance its security by not focusing on the national question and avoiding any 
action that would have been perceived as threatening by its neighbours, however, under 
the new circumstances this foreign policy line could no longer provide security.
The new national security strategy adopted by Albania had become more 
assertive. While stating that Albania recognised the unviability of borders thus rejecting 
the idea o f national unification and supporting a peaceful resolution of the problem, it 
also declare that if Serbia started its ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosova, Albanians 
would react as one nation which could lead to a larger Balkan war^ *^ . This foreign policy 
stance was meant to serve two goals; to work as a deterrent against the Serbian threat and 
urged the US to become more involved in the region. The Christmas warning announced 
by President Bush in December 1992 and later confirmed by Clinton threatened Serbia 
with military action, if it provoked a war in Kosova. This was an indication of the shared 
interests between the US and Albania in preventing the war from spreading, which 
provided the bases for forging a close relationship. Bilateral relations form the building 
block whereby a larger strategy can be built.^' In this contexts Albania and the Albanians 
provided the US and NATO with an important factor to maintain stability. For Albania 
the close association with the US provided the government with the necessary security to 
focus on the question of the economic transformation. In addition, Albania pursued an 
active policy at the regional level with the aim of building an anti-Milosevic coalition.”  
In these attempts it also tried to differentiate between Montenegro and Serbia. In all these 
endeavours, Albanian state closely coordinated its activities with the Kosova shadow
Louis Zanga, “Albania Afraid of the War over Kosova", RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 1, No.46, 20 
November, 1992.
Albania in Transition^ p. 251.
Gazmend Xhudo, Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans, MacMillan Press, 1996, p. 4
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g t. This close cooperation at the institutional level strengthened the firmness of
Albanians in Kosova to carry on their resistance in a peaceful way.^’
close relationship was based on certain principles; Albania recognised the 
political will of the Albanias in Kosova; only the legitimate institutions of the Albanians 
in Kosova could carry out negotiations on the future of Kosova; Albania supported the 
peaceful resolution of the conflict and recognised the state borders; Albanians will react 
as one nation in case of conflict in Kosova.
Despite the great progress that was made in the inter-Albanian cooperation, the 
picture was not so rosy as it seemed. The relationship between Albania and Kosova, 
though conducted through institutional channels, had remained confined to two political 
forces. Democratic Party (DP) and the Democratic League of Kosova, (DLK) or even in 
between two individuals; Berisha and Rugova as some would say.^“* DP and LDK did not 
try to reach out to other political forces in Albania and Kosova in order to establish a 
wider an open dialogue on the national question,^^ which led the opposition parties to 
develop their own separate strategies. This lack of consensus on the national question 
proved to be very costly for the Albanians when the crisis broke out. The mutual support 
and cooperation of Berisha and Rugova was not only confined to their national question 
but served also their domestic political aims. Rugova publicly supported Berisha and PD 
policies during national elections and the referendum on the constitution. This attitude 
undoubtedly increased the already existing gap between Rugova and the Socialist Party. 
Whereas Berisha, by strongly supporting Rugova and his peaceful policies, and by
EE/1588/BBC World Summary, 12 January, 1993 
Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta m  Kosova, p. 28
FabiM Schmidt, “Balancing the Power Triangle”, Transition, 26 May, 1995, p.39, Louis Zanga. "Tlie 
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maintaining contacts only with him, contributed to the marginalisation of the other 
political figures in Kosova.^®
Strong cooperation that developed between Albania and Kosova notwithstanding, 
Tirana was in no position to assist the Albanians in Kosova to achieve their 
independence. By supporting the Ghandian policies of Rugova, Albania had clearly 
indicated that its principle concern was the prevention of conflict. The endorsement of 
Kosova statehood would have exacerbated regional tensions and threatened the Albanian 
security. Therefore, Albania declared that it would accept a solution that provided not 
less than the rights Albanians enjoyed under 1974 constitution. This stance of the 
Albanian government was adopted immediately after coming to power of Berisha in 
march 1992. In an interview with Reuters he urged Serbia to restore autonomy to ethnic 
Albanians thus the basis for a political settlement.
Until late 1996, Albanian foreign policy remained unchanged. It continued to 
support Rugova’s peaceful policy and it urged the US and Western countries to exercise 
pressure on Belgrade to initiate negotiations with Prishtina and restore autonomy so as to 
defuse tensions in the region. However, the political realities that had shaped Albania s 
foreign policy in the early 1990s had changed significantly by 1996. The exclusion of 
Kosova from the peace negotiations in Dayton marked a serious setback to the efforts of 
Rugova and Berisha to internationalise the problem and bring about a settlement. In the 
wake o f the Dayton Agreement the importance of Albania’s regional role decreased as 
the as the fighting in Bosnia ended and the threat of a spill over to the neighbouring
Socialist Party Calls for a Round Table of Albanian and Kosovo Parties on Kosova. “Koha Jone" Lc/l.c, 
8 June 1994, pp. 3-4. BBC Monitoring Service, 21 June 1994.
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countries sul^sided, while the D o s it in n  n f  ± i
P Belgrade was strengthened since its support
was deemed cmcial for the peace accord in Bosnia.
As Dayton shattered the Kosovar Albanians’ hope that their endurance would be 
rewarded it became clear that a new strategy had to be adopted. Nevertheless, Berisha 
continued to support Rugova's peaceful policies and coupled this with calls for the 
Albanians to accept autonomy. In this way Berisha put pressure on Rugova.^’ In the face 
of growing radicalisation in Kosova this policy significantly undermined Tirana’s 
authority. From this point Rugova and Berisha started to loose their control of the 
situation in Kosova, and the initiative gradually, as the course of events showed, shifted 
to other groups that had been playing no role in Kosova’s politics until then.
International image of Albania was tarnished after the controversial elections of 
May 1996. Albanian government came under international pressure, and the relations 
with the US, which had been remarkable until then, deteriorated significantly.^^ During 
all this period Tirana’s policy toward Kosova continued to remain unchanged. It was only 
after the start of the opposition protests in Belgrade that we notice a change. Berisha 
called on the Albanians of Kosova to stage peaceful protests in support of the Serbian 
opposition arguing that the démocratisation of Serbia was important for the resolution of 
the Kosova question.^^ The novelty of this stand consisted of two things. In contrast to 
the previous cautious policy of Albania this was a bold move. Secondly, for the first time 
Berisha was openly challenging Rugova’s position, which maintained that the protests 
were an internal Serbian affair, and that there was no difference between Milosevic and
' Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, p.29 дтд  m'wc 'тспсу Tirana
Albania: President Calls for the Restoration of the Autonomy or “jijc Albanian National
1927 GMT 26 December 1995, BBC Monitoring Service 1 January, 1996. Surroi, The Albanian National
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the opposition. The rift between Berisha and Rugova became clear as the press in Kosova 
started attacking Berisha.W hether the move of Berisha marked the beginning of a more 
assertive policy by Albania is difficult to say due to the outbreak of the crisis in Albania.
3.4. Albania’s Foreign Policy Toward Macedonia
Although the disintegration of Yugoslavia further fragmented the Albanians in the 
Balkans, the establishment of an independent Macedonian state was in the interest of 
Albania and the Albanians in general. The decision of Macedonia not to remain in rump 
Yugoslavia weakened Serb regional standing and separated the two historical enemies of 
Albania, namely Greece and Serbia. In addition, both countries shared similar interests. 
They were being squeezed by the Greeco-Serb^^ axis and could offset some o f the 
pressure by developing close economic and political ties.^“* Due to these considerations, 
Tirana strongly supported Macedonia’s stability and independence, and urged the 
Albanians of Macedonia to work toward this end. While Albania showed interest in the 
welfare of the ethnic Albanians the issue was not the main factor shaping bilateral 
relations. As we trace the development of Albanian-Macedonian relations we notice that 
the overriding security concern -  stability of Macedonia -  prevailed over other 
concems.^^ As showed in the first chapter, Berisha and Rugova did not support the move 
of the Albanians in Macedonia for territorial autonomy afraid that this would trigger 
Serbian intervention.
^  Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p. 315
Albania: Foreign Minister says Kosovo issue... ATA news agency, Tirane, 28 December 1996
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During the Gligorov’s visit to Albania in June 1992 Berisha supported the 
Albanians’ demand for constituent nations status in Macedonia, and linked the 
recognition of Macedonia with the latter’s respect for Albanians rights there. Following 
the meeting, the economic relations between the two countries intensified. The 
transportation of oil through Albania was made possible and in December Berisha and 
Gligorov met again on the occasion of the opening of new border points. The meeting 
happened after the Bit Pazar incident, and in this way it contributed to defuse tensions. 
These contacts indicated Albania had de facto recognised Macedonia.^^ De jure 
recognition was extended immediately after the UN recognition of Macedonia in April 
1993, notwithstanding Macedonian authorities failure to address any o f the Albanian 
grievances. Albania’s position was reversed because Tirana thought that the recognition 
o f Macedonia would improve the conditions between the two countries thus creating the 
necessary conditions for solving the status o f Albanians in Macedonia.^’ A similar 
change in policy occurred on the issue of Macedonia’s membership in OSCE that had 
been vetoed by Albania and Greece.
At the end of 1993 the relations between the two countries experienced, for a brief 
period, deterioration due to the occurrence of two events. The first was the arms affair 
that we have already mentioned in the first chapter. Macedonian authorities announced 
that they had discovered a paramilitary organisation that had connections with Tirana. 
Considering the Albanian policy toward Macedonia such allegations sounded very 
absurd. In its policy toward the Kosova question, primary concern of Albania was to 
avoid a conflict with Serbia. The same thing held true for Macedonia, which was
36 BiberaJ, “Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg”, p. 18.
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illustrated by the continuous call on the Albanians in Macedonia to become a stabilising 
factor in Macedonia. Moreover, the Albanians had decided to create trouble in 
Macedonia at the end of 1993, after Macedonia had been admitted to the UN, and also 
after the US troops had been stationed there, and a number of European countries had 
established diplomatic relations with Macedonia. Following the incident Albanian 
Defence Minister and his Macedonian counterpart tried to minimise the importance of the 
event.
The second event, which was seen as hardening of the Albanian stance toward 
Macedonia^*, was Tirana’s involvement in the split of the party for Democratic 
Prosperity (PDP). The PDP had been suffering from internal dissent over the strategy to 
be employed in order to achieve the party’s goals. A faction composed of the cabinet and 
parliament members supported participation in the government as the best way to achieve 
the Albanians’ goals. Whereas the other group, led by Menduh Thaci and Arben Xhaferi, 
maintained that participation in government without any progress toward meeting 
Albanian grievances had weakened the bargaining position of the Albanians. In 
December 1993 the PDP leadership resigned. Tirana had openly supported Xhaferi and 
Thaci section. In the national congress in February 1994 the party split into two. The 
move by Albania brought about a strong reaction from Skopje. Under, American pressure 
Berisha urged the ‘radical’ group to exercise constraint^^. Careful observation o f the 
event and subsequent developments should raise a few questions in one’s mind.
Robert Austin, “Albania-Macedonian Relations, Confrontation or Cooperation?” RFE/RL Research 
Reports, p. 4.
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The differentiation of political forces in Macedonia by analysts between moderate 
and radical had been in vogue until the elections of 1998, though such political categories 
did not always reflect the reality. After the split of PDF, both groups kept the party’s 
program and statutes.'*” The use of labels, such as nationalist and moderate, as we showed 
in the first chapter, benefited the ruling forces in government. Secondly, the event gives 
the impression as if the key to understanding and controlling developments concerning 
Albanians outside Albania resides in Tirana. This image has also been reinforced by the 
way in which Western diplomacy in the region has been conducted. It has focused on 
Albania and Berisha instead of turning their attention to the local Albanian leaders in 
Macedonia and their grievances.·** Lastly, was there really a shift in Albania’s policy 
toward Macedonia? In February Greece imposed an embargo on Macedonia. That 
combined with the UN embargo on Yugoslavia, proved disastrous for the Macedonian 
economy. At this difficult situation Albania (and Bulgaria) provided Macedonia with 
alternative trade routes, without trying to capitalise on Macedonia’s weakness. This 
clearly illustrated that the overriding concern of Albania was Macedonia’s stability.*^
In the May of the same year, Berisha met with Gligorov for informal talks. The 
meeting focused primarily on how to increase economic cooperation between the two 
countries, and extend communication and transportation links. Berisha praised Gligorov 
for the steps taken to enlarge the middle school system, Albanian language media and the 
decision to hold the population census. The attitude o f Albania toward Macedonia did not 
change even after the incident following the establishment of the Albanian University in
Schmidt, “From National Consensus to Pluralism” p. 27.
Isa Blunmi, “The Question o f Identity, Diplomacy and Albanians in Macedonia”, International Journal 
o f  International Studies,
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Tetova. While Tirana recognised and supported the university its reaction toward Skopje 
was restrained/^ It is important to note that the Greek embargo still continued, when this 
event occurred.
Although the relations between Macedonian authorities and the Albanians in 
Macedonia provided considerable room for intervention Tirana did not exploit it.'*'’ The 
stability o f Macedonia and not the ethnic ties was and still is the main factor that has 
shaped Albanian-Macedonian relations. Fully aware of this'*  ^ and the constraints under 
which Albanian foreign policy operated due to the Kosovo question and the problematic 
relationship with Greece, Macedonian authorities did not have to make concessions to 
Albanians at home in order to maintain relations with Tirana at a satisfactory level. Apart 
from geostrategic considerations the attitude of Tirana toward Skopje has also been 
influenced by the place the Albanians of Macedonia occupy in the Albanian vision. For 
the Albanian political class it is Kosova that constitutes what we know as the Albanian 
national question, whereas the case of Macedonia is seen as ‘one of equal rights within
the existing state.’46
3.5. The Impact of 1997 Crisis on the Albanians of Kosova and Macedonia
The collapse of pyramid schemes in January 1997 and the armed revolt that 
ensued plunged Albania into anarchy. Did the crisis in Albania bring about a change in 
the political programs of the Albanians in Macedonia and Kosova?
Albania: Berisha Offers facilities to Macedonia to overcome Blockade, BBC Monitoring Service, 23 
February, 1994
Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p.242
Blazevska and Mehmeti, “Steering Through the Regional Troubles”, in The New Accommodation,
Macedonia: Premier Interviewed on Economic Crisis, Albania. ‘Koha Jone’ Tirana, 3 June 1995, BBC 
Monitoring Service, 8 June 1995, Quoting Macedonian PM: “Common sense says that it is in Albania’s 
interest for her neighbour to be stable”.
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Although, as we showed, Tirana had not been able to influence Belgrade’s and 
Skopje’s policies toward the Albanians, the latter have “viewed Albania as a potential 
stable ally whose rising international position would positively affect the US and EU 
policies toward Kosovo.”'*^  After the 1997 crisis Albania not only ceased from being a 
factor in Balkan politics but also presented to the world the image of a country that was 
unable to govern itself, which in turn badly damaged the quest of the Albanians in 
Kosova for statehood. However, the collapse of the Albanian state did not force the 
Albanians in Kosova and Macedonia to reconsider their objectives. The political agendas 
of the Albanians in Kosova and Macedonia reflected these communities’ historical 
experiences and the dynamics of power in their particular and immediate environments.'*^ 
It is for this reason that the national programs of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia 
differ from each other. The first pursuing independence, the other equal rights within the 
state. These political movements have developed independently from Tirana and do not 
rely on its support for their survival. That is why the answers to the Albanian questions in 
the Balkans should be found in Prishtina and Skopje.
3.6. Albania’s Foreign Policy on Kosova During the Socialist-led Government
Three main factors shaped Albanian foreign policy and account for its shift during 
Nano. The need of Nano government to strengthen their position domestically. As a 
result of 1997 crisis the legitimacy of state institutions had been severely damaged and 
the political scene was characterised by strong polarisation and the economy was in ruins. 
Against this background, no political force could have maintained power without the
Rubin Barnett, (ed.) Toward Comprehensive Peace in the Southeastern Europe, p.76-79 
Janusz Bugajski, “The Kosovar Volcano”, Transition vol.4, no.5, October 1997, p.69
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support of the West. It is in this context that we should understand Nano’s policy shift 
toward Kosovo.
In order to win the West’s support Nano presented himself as a moderate force 
that was charting a new course that was in contrast to the nationalistic policies of 
Berisha.'*^ As Nano put it in a report to the Parliament ‘our unwavering will to introduce 
into Albania Western political ethics and do away one by one with the concepts and the 
mentalities of the old and savage Balkans and Albanian policy.’ ®^ However, as we have 
seen, Berisha had not pursued nationalist policies; he had maintained good relations with 
Macedonia despite the later had not addressed any o f the Albanian grievances. In the case 
of Kosovo his primary concern had been to avoid the conflict. Although Berisha became 
a strong advocate of the Kosovo Albanians he did call for the restoration of autonomy 
and urged them to make compromises. Thus in order to differentiate his policy from the 
previous one Nano had to engage in spectacular acts like meeting Milosevic and 
abandoning all the principles on which Tirana-Prishtina cooperation was based.
The second factor that shaped Albanian foreign policy was the close relationship 
that Tirana developed with Athens at the expense of other regional allies. According to 
many observers Nano was under strong Greek influence. Lastly, what made easier 
Nano’s policy shift was the lack of consensus that had existed on the national question. 
As we noted earlier, the cooperation between Albania and Kosova had developed 
exclusively between two political forces DP and DLK. The other political forces were not 
consulted on the policy that Tirana pursued on the national question. As a result Nano
Isa Blumi, “The Question Of Identity, Diplomacy and Albanians in Macedonia”
Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, p. 55-56
Albania: Premier says solving the Kosova Crisis..., ‘Zeri I Popullit’, Reuters,! April, 1998. 
’’ Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, p. 56.
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could abandon the previous policy by identifying it with Berisha. In addition the 
continuous support that Rugova had given Berisha had resulted in estrangement between 
him and the Socialist Party in Albania. As the events unfolded it became clear that a kind 
of alliance had developed between Nano and those, opposing Rugova in Prishtina.
The meeting between Nano and Milosevic during the Crete summit of the Balkan 
countries had the embodiment of the new Albanian foreign policy. In a total policy 
reversal, Tirana had carried talks with Belgrade on Kosova when only the legitimate 
leaders of the Kosova Albanians were entitled to carry those talks. For Nano the full 
observation of the human rights in Kosova and the application of democracy were seen as 
sufficient conditions to initiate a dialogue with Belgrade.^^ Nano also called for direct 
contacts between Prishtina and Belgrade without the presence of a third party. The new 
policy had obviously changed from being a factor of support for Kosova Albanians to one 
of pressure. In line with this policy Nano criticised Kosovar parallel institutions saying 
that they were not a solution; on the contrary, they radicalised the societies that had 
created them. "^*
The new policy o f Tirane was strongly criticised by the Kosovar Albanians, 
which asked the ‘government in Tirana to give the same support as its predecessor’ and 
reminded it that the ‘relations between Albania and Kosova is not one o f a mother 
daughter country.’^^  The contacts between Tirana and Prishtina had almost broken down.
Biberaj,^/Z)fl/i;a in Transition, p. 341.
Dena Kyrakiou, Greece: Tirana Belgrade agree to renew ties. Reuters, 4 November, 1997,
ENTER news agency, Tirana ,7 February, 1998
Leading ethnic Albanian Party criticises the Albanian premier. ‘Kosova Daily Report’, Prishtina, 3
November, 1997, BBC Monitoring Service, 05/11/97
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Despite criticisms at home Nano had won praise abroad. The Crete meeting had 
taken place with Athens’s blessing, which wanted to rehabilitate Milosevic.^^ The 
Western countries, too, had endorsed the meeting and gave their support to Nano.^’
Even after the outbreak of war in Kosova, in March 1998, the government’s 
attitude remained restrained and ambivalent.^* While all the political forces in Albania 
including the Socialists joined a massive rally in Tirana in support of Kosova under the 
motto ‘one nation, one stand’ the government failed to adopt these as the main building 
block of its policy. Tirana’s demand for NATO troops to be deployed in the northeastern 
border to prevent a spillover into Albania clearly pointed to the lack of this principle. 
Tirana was trying to insulate itself from the crisis in Kosova. Tirana did not formulate a 
policy of its own to present the Albanian view on Kosova. Rather it played the role of the 
obedient partner of the West.^^ However, not much could be expected from the weakened 
Albanian state, if we consider the fact that even the previous government had not been 
able to achieve much on Kosova, though it had been in a much stronger position. The 
criticism of Nano’s policies had to do more with a lack of willingness and desire to help 
on the side of the government.
As fighting escalated in Kosova, during the May-June period, and the lack of 
intervention from the West, Nano toughened his rhetoric, as illustrated from one of his 
declarations that Albania was ‘on the eve of war’ with Yugoslavia and called for NATO 
intervention^®. However, the main driving force behind his policy had not changed. In
Dina Kiykidou, Greece: Albania, Belgrade agree to renew ties.
Germany: Albania-Kinkel supports Albania’s policy of dialogue with Belgrade, ATA news agency, 
Tirane, 15 November, 1997, BBC Monitoring Service, 18/11/97, British Foreign Secretary promises 
Premier continuous support, ATA, 15 December, 1997 
IC Group Report: The View From Tirana: The Albanian dimension o f the Kosova crisis 10/07/98 
Mero Baze, “War in Kosova and Albanian Paralyses”, Gazeta Albania, 3 June, 1998 
Austria: Albania says on the eve of war with Yugoslavia, Reuters 22 June, 1998.
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Crans Montana Nano openly opposed independence for Kosova as not being the best way 
to end the fighting and suggested that the ‘right solution would be the creation of a 
democratic framework, be it a local parliament or administration . His demand did not 
even match that of the international community that had asked for substantial autonomy. 
But what was more important than his pronouncement on the future status o f Kosova was 
his attempt to establish himself as the only reliable and indispensable partner of the West. 
In Crans Montana Nano declared that Rugova had become a man without any authority, 
while adding that he had ‘information that the KLA has the capacity and the authority to 
be included into a negotiation process, and that Tirana was ‘trying to contact every one 
possible on the ground with due influence to moderate KLA factions.^’
The need to win West’s support in order to shore up his position at home, is the 
main driving force behind Nano’s foreign policy. Despite widespread corruption and 
persecution o f the opposition the West continued to support the Socialist led 
govemment.^^ Following the violence that was sparked as a result o f the assassination o f 
Azem Hajdari, a leading Democratic party figure. Nano was forced to resign and was 
succeeded by Pandeli Majko.
The foreign policy pursued by Majko has changed substantially from his 
predecessor’s. It has become more assertive; and has increased considerably his support 
for the Albanians in Kosova.^^ Although the hardening of his stance has been described 
as a ‘return to the Balkan nation’s traditional line on Kosova’, Majko’s policy is different 
from Berisha’s as well. Both Berisha and Nano breached the pledge that Albania
Elif Koban, Swetzerland; Interview-Albania PM urges Balances view on Kosova, Reuters, 26 June, 1998 
Daniel McAdams, “Don’t Look Now: Another Albanian Nightmare”, Human Events, 10/16/98, vol.54, 
issue 39, p.6
“  Benet Koleka, Albania: Analysis -  Albania seen as hardening Kosova stance, Reuters, 22 January, 1999
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recognises the will o f the Albanians in Kosova and proposed autonomy as an acceptable 
solution. In contrast Majko, clearly stated that ‘Albania should not embark on the road of 
giving recipes’ and that his government was formulating his policy according to this 
line. '^* A week from the start o f the bombing campaign and as the Serbian campaign of 
ethnic cleansing was underway, Majko went as far as saying that ‘independence is an 
option that can be discussed very clearly now’.^  ^ This was a bold statement considering 
the fact that NATO members were opposed to independence.
3.7. The Foreign Policy of the Socialist-led Government Toward Macedonia
The policy of the Socialist-led government toward Macedonia, similar to the 
Democratic party’s policy, continued to subordinate the ethnic ties to the security 
concerns and maintenance o f good relations. However, while the main contours of 
foreign policy remained the same the cooperation between the two contries received a 
boost, as was indicated, by the visit o f Nano to Skopje and signing of eight agreements in 
the fields o f justice, transportation, economy and finance. Following the outbreak of war 
in Kosova in March 1998, the countries increased their cooperation in the security area as 
well to prevent arms and drug trafficking and illegal border crossings.
The same policy was followed by Majko, too, and did not change with the coming 
to power of a new coalition in Macedonia. The cooperation between Albania, Macedonia 
and Montenegro increased during the Kosova crisis, as these countries were trying to 
avoid the destabilising effects of Milosevic’s policies, and cope with the refugee crisis.
^  Albania -  Interview. Albanian PM backs Kosova Albanian line, Reuters, 25 October, 1998 
Richard Murphy, Albania -  Interview. Kosova Independence an option. Reuters 1 April 1999,
^  Cooperation with Macedonia necessary in the context o f Kosovo crisis. ATA news agency, Tirane 17 
March, 1998
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3.8. Lack of Nationalism in Albania
As noted earlier, the policies of the Communist regime in Albania had harmed the 
nationalistic feelings among the population. A prominent Albanian writer Ismail Kadare 
described the situation prevailing in Albania as follows. “In Albania there is no national 
hysteria. On the contrary the Albanians have gone to the other extreme that of too great 
indifference. Because one should be committed to the destiny o f one’s country in a 
prudent and reasonable manner.”^^  It is this lack of interest by the Albanian public that 
allowed the Albanian political class to play with the national issue and fail to formulate a 
clear policy, acceptable to all. The attitude o f political parties in Albania toward Kosova 
was not a factor that influenced the election results.^* Albanians at a very critical period 
of their history, lacked the necessary vision to understand the developments in Kosova as 
closely linked with their future. It was only with the outbreak of conflict in Kosova and 
especially the refugee crisis, .that the Albanians started to become more aware, of the fact 
that their future was linked to that of Kosova as well. With increased contacts on both 
sides, now that the border has become fictitious, this attitude is bound to change, and an 
Albanian society that feels much closer to each other is slowly emerging.
Interview with Ismail Kadare, “Dealing a Blow to the Dictatorship”, Transition, Vol. 1, No. 20,3 
November 1995, p. 64
68 ‘Keeping Out”, Economist, 5/21/94/ Vol. 331, Issue 7864, p. 65.
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CONCLUSION
The Albanian question in the Balkans does not appear in the traditional form of a 
‘mother country’ that is pursuing irredentist goals. Throughout its history Albania has 
never played the role of a mother country. A weak and vulnerable state, Albania, has 
always been preoccupied with its own survival. The best way to achieve this was by not 
focusing on the national question. This was a clear dimension of Albanian foreign policy 
during the inter-war period, as well as during the communist era. The Albanian foreign 
policy became more assertive following the collapse o f Yugoslavia and the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe. However, even in this case the prevention of conflict 
remained the overriding concern. Albania was not able to influence positively the 
developments in Kosova. At beast it tried to maintain the status quo.
The establishment of an independent Macedonian state worked in the interests o f 
the Albania. It weakened Serbia’s regional standing and it divided the two historical 
enemies o f Albania, Greece and Serbia. Despite the government changes the foreign 
policy o f Albania toward Macedonia remained constant. The ethnic tie was subordinated 
to the overriding security concern of maintaining Macedonian independence and stability, 
and maintaining good bilateral relations. Albania continuously urged the Albanians of 
Macedonia to become a factor of stability.
The Albanian question has continued to exist due to the strength of the Albanian 
community in Yugoslavia derived from their large numbers, territorial compactness, 
homogeneity, and a well-developed national consciousness. Their history under 
Yugoslav rule has been marked by a succession of unsuccessful attempts to break off
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Yugoslavia. Until the disintegration o f Yugoslavia the Albanian question was not an 
international question, but remained at the domestic level. It was only in the 1990s that 
the Albanian question became salient.
With the disintegration of Yugoslavia the differences between the Albanians in 
Kosova and Macedonia became obvious. While the first pursued independence as the 
only legitimate goal, the other accepted the Macedonian state and worked toward the 
achievements of equal rights with Macedonians. These differences reflected the lack of a 
pan-Albanian decision-making center, which would have formulated a common political 
program for all the Albanians in former Yugoslavia, and at the same time, it showed the 
different historical experiences and the dynamics of power within the territory of Kosova 
and Macedonia. Because of this, the events in Kosova should be seen separately from 
those in Macedonia.
This reality is in stark contrast with the view held by the international community 
which saw the two communities as closely linked to each other. Action in Prishtina 
would have initiated a chain reaction by the Albanians in Macedonia and Albania. It is on 
such an understanding of the developments that the contradictory attitude o f the 
international community lied. While on the one hand, there was general agreement that 
the crisis in Kosova had to be defused, on the other, there was caution that support for the 
Kosovar Albanians might destabilise the region. In other words, the resolution of the 
conflict in Kosova was prejudiced by its perceived effect on Macedonia. Many analysts 
have criticised the West’s policy, on the grounds that by ruling out independence to 
Kosova, as an accepted solution, it was legitimizing Milosevic’s goals, thus leading to a 
protracted war. They argue that dangers to regional stability do not come from the
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independence o f Kosova but from a policy that prolonged the life o f Milosevic’s doomed 
federation.
During the Kosova conflict it became clear that the source of instability in the 
Balkans resided in Belgrade. The Belgrade regime through the refugee crisis, but also by 
other means, tried to destabilize the neighboring countries, with the aim o f trying to 
remove the attention of the international community from the conflict in Kosova.
At the international level the independence of Kosova does not set dangerous 
precedent. “Kosova has been an extraordinary episode in the modem history, but not 
because some knew destabilizing was established. Rather, Kosova is the rare case where 
the strict conditions set by international law of secession were met”. At the regional level, 
too, the strengthening of the Albanian factor as a result of Kosova’s independence does 
not pose a threat to Macedonians’ security, since it does not change the basic geostrategic 
relationship which resulted in the creation o f Macedonia. Albanian leaders in Tirana, 
Prishtina or Skopje have consistently declared that they support a stable and independent 
Macedonia. The independence o f Kosova rather than provoking calls for a greater 
Albania would actually resolve the Albanian question and pacify their demands.
The political program of the Albanians o f Macedonia is confined to the borders o f 
Macedonia, in the sense that they do not see their future outside it. There is also, no 
support from either Prishtina or Tirana for the dismemberment of Macedonia, which is a 
sufficient condition in itself to preserve the stability o f Macedonia.
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